Methods and systems for device authentication

ABSTRACT

A method for disabling a device associated with a virtual identity may include receiving, from the device, a request to use the virtual identity, where the request that may include a passcode guess and a device identifier. The method may also include determining that the passcode guess does not authorize use of the virtual identity and incrementing a number of incorrect passcode guesses received within a time interval. The method may additionally include determining that the number of incorrect passcode guesses received within the time interval is greater than or equal to a threshold. The method may further include storing an indication that subsequent requests associated with the device identifier should not authorize use of the virtual identity.

CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.13/745,354, filed Jan. 18, 2013, which is incorporated herein byreference. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/745,354 claims thebenefit of the following four U.S. Provisional Patent Applications, eachof which are incorporated by reference into this application for allpurposes:

-   -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/609,848, filed Mar.        12, 2012 entitled “Methods and Systems for Secure Identity        Management”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/609,515, filed Mar.        12, 2012 entitled “Method and System for Pairing of Mobile        Devices”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/609,854, filed Mar.        12, 2012, entitled “Methods and Systems for Device Disablement”;        and    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/588,084, filed Jan.        18, 2012, entitled “Single Identification for Transactions”.

The following four regular U.S. patent applications are incorporated byreference into this application for all purposes.

-   -   U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/745,332, filed Jan. 18,        2013, entitled “Methods and Systems for Secure Identity        Management”;    -   U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/745,341, filed Jan. 18,        2013, entitled “Methods and Systems for Pairing Devices”;    -   U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/745,318, filed Jan. 18,        2013, entitled “Secure Population of Form Data”; and    -   U.S. patent application Ser. No. 31/745,304, filed Jan. 18,        2013, entitled “Secure Graphical Code Transactions”.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

As many everyday transactions move to an online environment, a largeamount of personal information must be sent over the Internet. Manyexperts consider the insecurity of online identities to be the mostimportant problem to be solved on the Internet today. Users of socialnetworks, online banking, and email are in constant danger of phishing,malware, and key logging attacks, as well as massive centralized databreaches that expose users' passwords and financial account information.

Despite the widespread use of personal information over the Internet,there is a need in the art for improved methods and systems for accountverification.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to online, or virtualidentities. More specifically, the present invention relates to methodsand systems for disabling devices after a number of incorrect passcodeguesses. Merely by way of example, the invention has been applied to amethod of disabling a device attempting to use or authorize a virtualidentity. Furthermore, the invention has been applied to a method ofdisabling a device used in a pairing operation. The methods andtechniques can be applied to a variety of transactions, interactions,and identity management systems.

In one embodiment, a method for disabling a device associated with avirtual identity may include receiving, from the device, a request touse the virtual identity, where the request that may include a passcodeguess and a device identifier. The method may also include determiningthat the passcode guess does not authorize use of the virtual identityand incrementing a number of incorrect passcode guesses received withina time interval. The method may additionally include determining thatthe number of incorrect passcode guesses received within the timeinterval is greater than or equal to a threshold. The method may furtherinclude storing an indication that subsequent requests associated withthe device identifier should not authorize use of the virtual identity.

In some embodiments, the method may also include sending, to one or moreuser devices associated with the virtual identity, an indication thatthe device cannot authorize the use of the virtual identity. The methodmay additionally include receiving, from an authorized user device: asecond passcode guess and an indication that the device should bereauthorized, determining that the second passcode guess authorizes theuse of the virtual identity, and determining that the subsequentrequests associated with the device identifier can authorize the use ofthe virtual identity.

In some embodiments one or more user devices associated with the virtualidentity may be allowed to provide correct passcode guesses andauthorize use of the virtual identity. The passcode guess may be basedon a PIN. The passcode guess may comprise a hash of a salted password.The indication that the device cannot authorize the use of the virtualidentity may comprise a push notification to a smart phone. The numberof incorrect passcode guesses may be reset when a valid passcode guessis received.

In another embodiment, a method for disabling a device associated with avirtual identity may include receiving, from the device, a request toregister an unregistered device. The request may include a passcodeguess and a device identifier. The method may also include determiningthat the passcode guess does not authorize registration of theunregistered device and incrementing a number of incorrect passcodeguesses received within a time interval. The method may additionallyinclude determining that the number of incorrect passcode guessesreceived within the time interval is greater than or equal to athreshold. The method may further include storing an indication thatsubsequent requests associated with the device identifier should notregister unregistered devices.

In some embodiments, the method may also include sending the indicationthat subsequent requests associated with the device identifier shouldnot register unregistered devices to a pairing repository. The methodmay additionally include receiving a request to register a secondunregistered device, where the request may include a second passcodeguess and the device identifier. The method may further include denyingthe request to register the second unregistered device based on thestored indication.

In some embodiments the passcode guess may comprise a digital signaturederived from a user-provided passcode. The unregistered device maycomprise a smart phone. The request to register the unregistered devicemay further comprise an encrypted salt value. The request to registerthe unregistered device may further comprise a pairing code.

In yet another embodiment, an identity repository may include one ormore interfaces that receive requests from user devices, one or moreprocessors, and one or more memories communicatively coupled to the oneor more processors, having instructions stored thereon, which, whenexecuted by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processorsto receive a request from the device through the one or more interfaces,the request comprising a passcode guess and a device identifier. Theinstructions may further cause the processor(s) to determine that thepasscode guess is incorrect, increment a number of incorrect passcodeguesses received within a time interval, determine that the number ofincorrect passcode guesses received within the time interval is greaterthan or equal to a threshold, and generate an indication in the one ormore memories that subsequent requests associated with the deviceidentifier should not be granted.

In some embodiments, the instructions may also cause the processor(s) tosend the indication to a pairing repository that is physically separatefrom the identity repository. The one or more memories may further storeencrypted personal information associated with a virtual identity, wherethe device identifier may be associated with the virtual identity. Therequest from the device may include a request to use a virtual identity.The request from the device may include a request to pair anunregistered device with a virtual identity.

Numerous benefits can be achieved byway of the present invention overconventional techniques. For example, embodiments of the presentinvention eliminate the risk posed by a single compromised devicewithout disabling other devices or the virtual identity itself.Additionally, embodiments of the present invention may be used with anidentity repository and/or a pairing repository. Preferences may offerfully customizable security settings, thresholds, time intervals, and/orcorrective actions. These and other embodiments along with many of itsadvantages and features are described in more detail in conjunction withthe text below and attached figures.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system for onlineidentity management, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system for onlineidentity management with distributed secrets, according to oneembodiment.

FIG. 3 illustrates a simplified flowchart illustrating a method forauthorizing a virtual identity using an access device for an interactionwith a resource over a network, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 4 illustrates a simplified flowchart illustrating a method ofauthorizing a virtual identity by an identity repository for aninteraction between an access device and a resource, according to oneembodiment.

FIG. 5 illustrates a simplified flowchart illustrating a method forauthorizing a virtual identity using a control device for an interactionbetween an access device and a resource, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 6 illustrates a simplified flowchart illustrating a method ofverifying, by a resource, that a virtual identity is authorized for usein an interaction between an access device and the resource, accordingto one embodiment.

FIG. 7 illustrates a simplified flow diagram of communications within asystem for online identity management, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 8 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system forregistering and sharing secret information with an unregistered device,according to one embodiment.

FIGS. 9A-9B illustrate simplified flowcharts of methods for registeringand sharing secret information with an unregistered device, according toone embodiment.

FIG. 10 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system forregistering and verifying a passcode provided by an unregistered device,according to one embodiment.

FIG. 11 illustrates a simplified block diagram of an alternate systemfor registering and verifying a passcode provided by an unregistereddevice, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 12 illustrates a simplified flowchart of a method for registeringand verifying a passcode provided by an unregistered device, accordingto one embodiment.

FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified flow diagram of communications within asystem for pairing devices, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system for devicedisablement, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 15 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system for devicedisablement when pairing unregistered devices, according to oneembodiment.

FIG. 16 illustrates a flowchart of a method for disabling devicesassociated with a virtual identity, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 17 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a system for devicedisablement, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 18 illustrates a simplified block diagram illustrating componentsof an exemplary operating environment in which various embodiments ofthe present invention may be implemented.

FIG. 19 illustrates a simplified block diagram illustrating an exemplarycomputer system in which embodiments of the present invention may beimplemented.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Embodiments of the present invention relate to technologies that providefor an identity management system and method that eliminate the need forcentralized storage of secrets. Additionally, technologies related toembodiments of the present invention provide for an identity managementsystem and method that eliminate the need to use shared secrets betweentwo parties.

Genera Overview

Virtual identities are currently in widespread use in myriad, such asthe Internet. However, existing solutions are unable to provideconsumers with a way to authenticate transactions and identities that isboth convenient for the user as well as secure against modern-daythreats. Most systems still use a username and password, a method thatwas invented over 50 years ago Thus, managing digital identities remainsinconvenient, insecure, and hard to use. More importantly, phishing,malware, and key logging attacks, as well as massive centralized databreaches exposing users' passwords and credit card information arebecoming more frequent.

There are two fundamental reasons that existing solutions lack adequatesecurity. First, these solutions rely on the use of shared secrets, suchas passwords, credit card numbers, and authorization tokens Second,these solutions rely on the centralized storage of these secrets.Currently, every consumer website requires using a shared secret tologin.

In contrast, the methods and systems described herein solve this problemby introducing a new paradigm for identity management that is based onpublic-key cryptography that is immune to a single point of compromiseas well as human engineering (i.e., phishing). Additionally, thesemethods and systems give control of the users identity to the user.These methods are also fully compatible with the National Strategy forTrusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) standards set by the U.S.Government for digital identity. These methods and systems eliminate theneed for users to memorize or keep track of hundreds of usernames andpasswords.

Broadly speaking, with respect to a particular embodiment, users mayfirst provide proof to their device that they are present, for example,using a password. Then, the user's device authenticates their identityusing public-key cryptography to websites, desktop applications, mobileapplications, and/or enterprise applications Using this disclosure, onehaving skill in the art can modify any existing website to accept anauthentication using this form of public key cryptography. Eachindividual device can be preauthorized for use by a particular user.This may be done with a one-time process using a pairing code andpassword. After each device has been authorized for use by the user, theuser can log into that device simply by selecting their name from a listof user names authorized on that device. A password may also be requiredif specified by the user.

Consequently, in this embodiment, password phishing, key logging, andguessing attacks are much harder to accomplish since the password canonly be entered on pre-authorized devices and because high valuetransactions can require out-of-band (OOB) approval using a differentdevice and a different code. Generally, a virtual identity may beauthenticated between an access device and a resource. As used herein,an “OOB authorization” refers to an authorization that requires inputfrom either a third device, referred to as a control device, or from asecond software process operating on the access device. Once a device islogged in under a user, individual resources can then be accessed bypressing a “sign in” button on an enabled website.

In some embodiments, users may optionally secure their account on anydevice from unauthorized use using a user-defined password of any lengthor with an OOB authorization. In one embodiment, an alert can pop up inan app on the user's mobile phone that asks for a PIN from the user. Inanother embodiment, a user could require a password be entered every 22hours (and every time the user identity is changed to the particularuser on that device), while a second user might not care and could allowanyone to switch to his/her identity on the same device without everentering a password. The level of security can be left up to the user.

In one embodiment, if the user is using a public terminal, lie/she canrequire that every use of his/her identity be approved by an OOBauthorization on a second device using a PIN code entered at least every“X” hours. This may prevent an active session from being compromised. Itis unlikely that an attacker will be able to sneak into a without auser's knowledge because OOB transactions can require the approval bythe second device.

One embodiment may also be used for information sharing. Users can storeany self-asserted attribute in their identity repository, such as theirname, shipping address(es), credit card information, and/or the like.Embodiments can then securely provide relying websites with this userinformation, without requiring manual entry of this information eachtime.

Some embodiments combine new elliptic curve cryptographic techniques(compliant with National Security Agency (NSA) Suite B standards) toprovide high security authentication without sacrificing usability. Inone embodiment, an innovative key-value data repository can be totallyencrypted (both the keys and values can be encrypted). Therefore, userscan always have express control of the use of their identity andattributes since it is impossible for the central repository to assert auser identity without cooperation of the user's endpoint device(s).

In one embodiment, the systems described herein can work with an openidentity federation where the members of the federation support an API.Users can choose their repository operator and transfer theircredentials between repositories securely. For example, a user workingfor a private company may choose to have the private company storehis/her identity. If the user later gets a job with the U.S. Government,he/she can easily move his/her identity without modification to arepository hosted by the U.S. Government. This is similar to the way auser can get a credit card from one bank, change banks, and then get anew credit card that will work with the same set of merchants as the oldcard.

At the most basic level, the embodiments described herein can be used toassist in authenticating, or logging in, to websites and other serviceson the Internet. Desktop, enterprise, and/or mobile apps can similarlybe enabled so that users are not required to type anything to log in.These embodiments can also be used for authentication, filling outforms, secure credit card transactions, authorizations, and/orinformation sharing. In one embodiment, the system can be used to provedigital claims. For example, a user could prove claims such as theirage, student status, current employment, veteran status, right to usedigital content like music and software, proof of citizenship, and/orthe like. In another embodiment, the system can be used as a repositoryfor digital proofs, such as software music licenses, receipts forphysical goods, proofs of purchase, and/or the like. These digitalproofs can be accessed at any time, because the system works on-line,off-line, and/or over the phone. Additionally, embodiments describedherein can be used to log into enterprise applications using a VPN orSSO portal. Identity proofs can be used to acquire a boarding pass or togain physical access to a building. An identity can be securely provedover a phone by entering four digits that are communicated to thereceiving party. Documents can be securely signed, and micro-paymentscan be secured. Finally, the system can facilitate “on paper”transactions, such as filling out a form at a doctor's office, byproviding a pairing code and an identifier. As used herein, the term“transaction” may broadly include any of the transactions listed above,along with other similar transactions that would be understood by onehaving skill in the art.

The embodiments described herein offer numerous advantages over existingsolutions. Depending on the particular embodiment, one or more of theseadvantages may be realized. For example, a user's identity andinformation, such as credit cards, may not be used without expressapproval. Forms can be automatically filled out Almost every existingweb browser can be used with minor alterations to login webpages.Identities can be portable, moving between different identity repositoryproviders. Micro-payments between users and vendors can be securelytransacted. Digital proofs of information can be provided such as age,status, or employment. Typing can be minimized by the user.Significantly, a user can be put in complete control of his identity andhow it is used. This allows the user to control the trade-off betweensecurity and convenience. Users can engage in high-value transactionsand other high-risk uses, while maintaining the convenience oftendesired for trivial uses. Resources, or “relying parties,” can dealdirectly with the user's access device, rather than a third-partyprovider.

In addition to these advantages in convenience for users, one or more ofthe following security advantages may also be realized. Website visitsneed not be tracked. Credit card transactions can be tokenized. NSAsuite B secure cryptography can be used. Secrets need not be shared butcan rather be decrypted at the endpoints. Endpoint devices can securelytransfer endpoint secrets to new devices securely. PINs and passwordscan be protected against brute force attacks. Fishing, key logging, andpassword guessing can be prevented because knowledge-basedauthentications, such as PINs and passwords, can be used onpreauthorized devices. Credit card transactions can use end-two-endsecurity that is digitally signed by the cardholder and verified by theacquirer and the issuer. Payment Card Industry (PCI) liability can bereduced because service providers may choose to never see credit cardnumbers that are tokenized. Finally, the system can be designed suchthat there is no single point of compromise that can lead to a masssecurity compromise Security levels can be set for each resource, suchthat banks can enforce a higher level of security than an e-mailaccount. Security levels can include a login timeout for each userdevice, such that less secure devices can be timed out faster Amountthresholds can be set for transactions as well as cumulative amountsover a time period, thus users can limit their exposure if a device iscompromised. Additionally, each attribute stored by a user, such as ashipping address or a credit card number, can have its own securitylevel. Compromised devices can be disabled after a certain number ofincorrect guesses for a password or PIN. Users can also log into theidentity repository to view every transaction using their identity.Security settings and permissions can require OOB approval with a PIN.In order to authorize a new user device, an identity repository mayrequire possession of an existing authorized device and knowledge of aPIN and/or a password.

In one embodiment, the identity repository is designed for a user topair his/her identity to a device owned by the system administrator. Theuser device can be an access device, a control device, or both. Thesystem administrator can then switch to the user using customary “switchuser” mechanisms. The user can choose the permission levels that asystem administrator would need in order to do this. For example, theuser could require approval by the user's control device. The user canalso disable the system administrator's access to the user's identity atany time from any of the user's devices. In essence, the systemadministrator's device can be treated exactly as if it is yet anotherdevice owned by the user, so a user can delegate as much or as littleauthority as he/she wants to the system administrator.

In one embodiment, users can select between various options forauthenticating to each of their devices. These options may includeleaving the user permanently logged in and requiring a manual log out.Users could also select their name from a user list and type in theirpassword. Alternatively, users could select their name and confirm theiridentity using a control device and a pin. An auto-logout timeout can beindependently set for each user device.

Because the system does not require shared secrets, a virtual identitycan be difficult for a user to lose. So long as the user has a recoverycode or a user device that is registered with the identity repository,the user can recover their identity.

Secure Identity Management

FIG. 1 illustrates a simplified block diagram 100 of a system for onlineidentity management, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. The system may be configured to use one or two user devices.At its most basic level, the system can use an access device 106. Theaccess device 106 will typically be the device the user is using for aninteraction. Second, an optional control device 110 may be used. Thecontrol device 110 may comprise a personal device, such as a smartphone, tablet computer, personal computer, and/or personal digitalassistant (PDA) that is controlled by the user. Additionally, a remotelylocated identity repository 108 can be used in the interaction. Theaccess device 106 can engage in the interaction with a resource 102. Theresource can include a website, a database, a web service, and/or thelike. Man-in-the-middle attacks can be reduced because cryptographicsecrets can be transferred from user controlled endpoint devicessecurely, even if the identity repository is compromised by an attacker.

In this embodiment, the access device 106 (AD) may comprise a userdevice that is being authenticated to perform a transaction using avirtual identity. The control device 110 (CD) may comprise a second userdevice in the user's control that is used to set access rights for theusers access device 106 and to perform OB authentication/verification.The resource 102 (RP) may be defined as a party, typically a website, towhich the user wishes the virtual identity to be authenticated and,optionally, with which to share attributes and perform additionaltransactions. The identity repository 108 (Repo) may be defined as anonline database of encrypted credentials and attribute/value pairs. Theidentity repository 108 may be remotely located and may be operated by athird party that is not associated with either the user or the resource102. Each access device 106 and control device 110 may have a uniqueidentifier, referred to as a Device ID (DEVID). Additionally, each usermay have a unique identifier, or Global User ID (GUID), that is storedon the access device 106 and on the control device 110 and can be usedto index information stored on the identity repository 108. Finally,each user may have a second UID (UID) that comprises a site-specificidentifier for the user for the resource 102. The UID can be derived atleast in part from the fully-qualified domain name associated with theresource 102.

In one embodiment, the access device 106 and the identity repository 108can be required in order to complete a transaction. The control device110 can be a separate device from the access device 106, or the samephysical device can be used as both the access device 106 and thecontrol device 110. For example, a laptop can function as both theaccess device 106 and the control device 110. A mobile phone could alsofunction as both devices. Participation by the control device 110 mayoptionally be required in a transaction to provide a higher level ofassurance that the user has consented to the transaction. This processwill be described further below. At any time, the user may choose to usea higher security mode comprising a higher level of assurance. The usercan also choose to lock out any individual device or force theindividual device into a higher security mode. These actions can beperformed on any device registered by the user. Furthermore, someembodiments may employ a special “tripwire” feature so that, if apassword or PIN is not entered when requested, a device will beprevented from supplying any subsequent digital signatures until therequested password or PIN is provided.

As used herein, transactions may use a varying “Level of Assurance”(LoA) mode. In one embodiment, four modes are supported: disabled,enabled with no security, password with a timeout, and OOB authorizationrequired with an optional PIN and timeout. Users can control the LoAmode required by each type of transaction. To minimize risk in the caseof a lost user device, devices can be immediately turned off from anyremaining registered device that the user still controls. In oneembodiment, the identity repository 108 can enforce the greater of twoLoA modes: the level requested by the user and the level requested bythe resource 102. This can ensure that organizations, such as financialinstitutions, can be compliant with regulations regardless of thesecurity level requested by the user. For example, a bank could requirethat, for transaction to be approved, a PIN should be entered on thecontrol device 110 within a time period, such as 5 minutes. For banks,two factor authentication may be required by FFIEC regulations.

According to one embodiment, the conditions in an LoA mode may be basedon information related to the devices owned or operated on behalf of theuser or devices authorized for the user with limits on how devices canbe used in the transaction. For example, a desktop computer in a securework area may have a higher transaction value limit than a mobiledevice. A mobile device with a password-to-unlock feature may have ahigher transaction value limit than an unlocked mobile device One ofordinary skill in the art would recognize many variations,modifications, and alternatives.

The conditions in an LoA mode can include information related topreferences established by one of the parties, including transactionvalue limits, time periods during which transactions are initiated,geographic locations where the transaction is initiated, histories ofreturns or invalidated transactions, user reputations, number oftransactions within a particular time period, or the like. Theconditions in an LoA mode can also include cumulative data, includingthresholds for the number of items in a single purchase, cumulativecosts of items in a single transaction, cumulative amount spent in aparticular time period, and/or the like Therefore, the conditions in anLoA mode can comprise a cost threshold for a single transaction, acumulative cost threshold for transactions during a time period or atime limit since a password was provided to a user device. Theseconditions can be used to define almost every aspect of atransaction/interaction, such that a party can set specifiedauthentication levels that add security to high-value transactions ortransactions where the risk of fraud is high. It should be noted that ifpreferences received from a party contradict preferences already storedon the device executing this method, the more conservative or securepreferences can be used in the transaction.

According to one embodiment, the conditions in an LoA mode may alsoinclude conditions related to types of transactions. For example,purchasing certain types of goods, such as jewelry, cars, software,collectibles, or the like, that are more likely to be involved in theftand fraud can require higher levels of authentication. The conditionscan also include conditions on payment options. For example, purchasingitems with a credit card may require a first authorization level, whilepaying for items with a debit card may require a second authorizationlevel. The preferences can also include conditions on methods ofshipping or shipping locations. For example, shipping items to a PO Boxor to an address different from the billing address may require a higherauthorization level.

Each of the conditions of an LoA mode may be associated with one or moreauthentication levels. If the condition is met, then the specifiedauthentication level (or a higher authentication level) should be usedin the transaction/interaction. An authentication level can compriserequiring an indication that the transaction is approved to be receivedby a user module operating on a user device. For example, a user may berequired to provide input indicating that they have reviewed thetransaction and approve. An authentication level can also comprisenotifying additional devices that are associated with the user. Forexample, a notification can be sent to a user's cell phone or tabletcomputer for a transaction that was initiated on the user's desktopcomputer. An authentication level can comprise requiring a PIN orpassword to be received by one or more of the additional devicesassociated with the user, such as a control device. An authenticationlevel can comprise a waiting period between initiating the transactionand final approval. In one embodiment, an authentication level mayrequire human contact by a representative of the relying party. Inanother embodiment, an authorization level can require a third-party toauthenticate the transaction, such as the identity repository.

In one embodiment, an LoA mode can also specify a timeout periodassociated with each PIN and/or password. For example, one mode couldspecify that a password should be entered into the access device withinthe last three hours preceding the transaction/interaction. As anotherexample, one mode could specify that a PIN should be entered into thecontrol device within five minutes preceding the transactioninteraction. The timeout period may be affected by other factors, suchas the time of day of the transaction, a cost associated with thetransaction, the security of the device used in the transaction, acumulative cost of a set of transactions, and/or any other factorsdescribed above. For example, a timeout period may be longer on a securedevice, whereas the timeout period may be shorter on an insecure device.

What follows is a brief description of one exemplary transaction. Eachstep in this exemplary transaction will be discussed in more detaillater in this disclosure. Returning to block diagram 100 of FIG. 1, theaccess device 106 can access the resource 102 (112). In response, theresource 102 can return a random digital challenge and request that theaccess device 106 return the challenge signed by two or three signatures(114). Next, the access device 106 can generate one or more cloudrepository keys. The access device 106 can pass the digital challengeand/or the one or more cloud repository keys to the identity repository108 (116). If the access device 106 is password protected and a timeoutperiod is exceeded, the user may supply digital proof that the userknows the password to the access device 106. The digital proof maycomprise a guess of the password. In one embodiment, the digital proofis not transmitted off of the access device 106, not even in a hashed orencrypted form. Confirmation that the user knows the password isprovided by signing a challenge from the identity repository 108.

The identity repository 108 can compare a first LoA mode specified bythe access device 106 with a second LoA mode specified by the resource102 to determine whether an OOB approval should also be required for thetransaction. If an OOB approval is determined to be required by eitherthe access device 106, the identity repository 108, or the resource 102,the identity repository 108 sends a challenge to the control device 110(118). In one embodiment, certain details of the original transactioncan be displayed to the user on the control device 110, thus eliminatingthe possibility of a man-in-the-browser attack or a man-in-the-middleattack. A PIN can also be requested by the control device 110. If a PINhas not been provided within a timeout period, the control device 110may prompt the user to enter the PIN In one embodiment, any PIN guessentered by the user never leaves the control device 110. Instead, thecontrol device 110 can rely on asymmetric cryptography and anotherchallenge from the identity repository 108 to prove to the identityrepository 108 that the user has supplied the correct PIN. This processwill be described further later in this disclosure. Approval for thetransaction, along with any signed challenges, can be sent back to theidentity repository 108 (120). In one embodiment, the control device 110signs the challenge from the resource 102 using a private key stored onthe control device 110.

The identity repository 108 can enforce the LoA mode on the transaction.Therefore, the identity repository 108 can withhold its signature on thechallenge unless all of the requirements of the LoA mode have been met.If the identity repository 108 determines that all of these requirementshave been met, the identity repository 108 can sign the challenge usingits private key. The identity repository 108 can then send the signatureof the control device 110 and the signature of the identity repository108 to the access device 106 (122). At this point, the access device 106can sign the challenge and return all two/three signatures to theresource 102 (124). Additionally, the access device 106 can send a userID (the site-specific user ID). The resource 102 can look up a set ofpublic keys that are associated with the UID to verify that all threesignatures correspond to the public keys and grant access to the user.In one embodiment, the public keys can be unique to the resource 102. Inother words, each website will be associated with its own set of publicand private key pairs. This can assure a user's privacy and preventwebsite tracking. Because the resource 102 interacts with the accessdevice 106, the identity repository 108 can be prevented fromdetermining which resources the user has visited. The identityrepository 108 simply holds an encrypted block of data and receivescommands to read and write encrypted keys and values.

The identity management system can use a number of differentcryptographic keys that are stored on various devices throughout thesystem. Table 1 includes a list of specific encryption keys that may bestored according to one embodiment. It will be understood that this isbut one embodiment and that either more or fewer keys may be used inother embodiments.

TABLE 1 Key name Type Shared by Created by Plurality Access Master KeySymmetric, All ADs and First AD Per user (AMK) 128 bits Repo AccessDevice Key Symmetric, All ADs Derived from Per user (ADK) 128 bits AMKControl Master Key Symmetric, All CDs and First CD Per user (CMK) 128bits Repo Shared Device Key Symmetric, All ADs and Derived from Per user(SDK) 128 bits CDs AMK Access Device Asymmetric All ADs Derived from Peruser Signature keypair ECDSA, AMK (ADS) 256 bits Control DeviceAsymmetric All CDs Derived from Per user Signature keypair ECDSA CMK(CDS) 256 bits Access Identity Asymmetric ADs Derived from Per userSignature keypair ECDSA, AMK, RP name per RP (AIS) 256 bits ControlIdentity Asymmetric CDs Derived from Per user Signature keypair ECDSA,CMK, RP name per RP (CIS) 256 bits Repo User Key Symmetric, Repo RepoPer user (RUK) 128 bits Repo Identity Asymmetric Repo Derived from Peruser Signature keypair ECDSA, RUK, RP name per RP (RIS) 256 bits

FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified block diagram 200 of a system for onlineidentity management with distributed secrets, according to an embodimentof the present invention. The embodiment of FIG. 2 uses a subset of thekeys listed in Table 1. Note that the remaining keys in Table 1 may beoperative in the background of the system illustrated by FIG. 2.Additionally, the keys in FIG. 2 may be derived from one or more of thekeys listed in Table 1. As described earlier, an access device 210 mayengage in a transaction with a number of resources 202. Each of theresources 202 may have a set of public keys associated with a UID of auser of the access device 210. For example, resource 202-1 stores two tothree public keys for the UID 210, namely an AD public key 204-1 that isassociated with the access device 210, an IR public key 206-1 that isassociated with an identity repository 218, and, optionally, a CD publickey 208-1 that is associated with a control device 224.

When the access device 210 first attempts a transaction with one of theresources 202, the access device 210 can provide the public keys 204,206, 208 to the resources 202. Each of the resources 202 may have aunique set of public keys. In providing the public keys 204, 206, 200,the access device 210 may create the AD public keys 204, and the IRpublic keys 206 and the CD public keys 208 can be obtained from theidentity repository 218 and the control device 224, respectively.

When initiating a transaction, the resources 202 can send a digitalchallenge to the access device 210 to authenticate a virtual identity.When the LoA mode requirements of each device of been met, each devicemay sign the digital challenge using the private keys that correspond tothe public key of the particular resource. For example, a digitalchallenge sent from resource 202-1 could be signed by the access device210 using AD private key 212 and the identity repository 218 using theIR private key 220. Optionally, the digital challenge could also besigned by the control device 224 using the CD private key 226. Each ofthese devices may enforce one or more requirements of the LoA modebefore signing. For example, the control device 224 may require a pinfrom the user, and the identity repository 218 may require an OOBauthorization from the control device 224. The access device 210 mayrequire a signature from the identity repository 218 as well as asignature from the control device 224 before signing the digitalchallenge. Other embodiments may enforce different requirements asdescribed elsewhere herein.

In one embodiment, each of these keys are actually stored on theirrespective devices. In another embodiment, a master key is stored andeach device from which the keys in FIG. 2 are deterministically derivedwhen they are needed. For example, the AD private key 212 may be derivedfrom the Access Device Key (ADK) for the access device 210 listed inTable 1.

Described next are specific methods according to particular embodimentsfor authorizing a transaction between an access device and a resource.Each of these methods will describe the transaction from the perspectiveof one of the least for devices involved, namely the resource, theaccess device, the identity repository, or the control device. FIG. 3illustrates a simplified flowchart 300 illustrating a method forauthorizing a virtual identity using an access device for an interactionwith a resource over a network, according to one embodiment. Thisparticular method may be carried out by the access device. The methodincludes sending, from an access device, a request to a resource througha network (310). In one embodiment, the resource comprises a webpage ora web service, while in another embodiment the resource comprises aprivate network. The access device can comprise any computer system,including a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a smart phone, a PDA,and/or the like. Generally, the network will be the Internet; however,the network may also comprise a private network, a LAN, a wirelessnetwork, and/or the like. In one embodiment, the request comprises auser clicking on a button provided on a website, the button executingJavaScript to begin the authorization procedure. The button may includetext or logos that identify the identity repository.

The method also includes accessing a resource challenge (312). In oneembodiment, the resource challenge comprises a JSON-formatted challengethat may comprise a nonce (an arbitrary number used only once in acryptographic communications). The nonce can be a representation of thetime of the transaction with sufficient resolution that all requestswill have a different timestamp. The nonce can also be a 128-bitpseudorandom value that will statistically never have multiple noncevalues collide. The nonce can be used both to avoid replay attacks andas a session token during the authentication flow. The resourcechallenge may be included in a data packet with other values, such asthe resource's domain name (RPDN). The data packet may further include alist of attribute profile names that are being requested by the resource(ATTR). The attribute profile names may be formatted as acomma-separated list. The data packet may further include a callback URLto which a response should be posted (CALLBACK).

The data packet may further include a set of requirements for an LoAmode requested by the resource (AUTHN). This can set the minimumrequirements for authenticating this transaction. An LoA mode set by theuser or by the identity repository can increase, but not decrease theserequirements, according to one embodiment. The LoA mode can berepresented using a bitmap containing flags, such as a flag indicatingwhether a confirmation is required from a control device, whether a PINis required from a control device, whether a password is required on anaccess device, whether a PIV card is present, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the resource challenge may be generated by theresource and transmitted from the resource to the access device. Inother embodiments, the resource challenge may be generated by the accessdevice itself. The resource challenge may be in a format that is knownto be acceptable to the resource. For example, the resource challengemay be a predetermined data packet with a date and time stamp. In someembodiments, the resource challenge may be comprised of details of thetransaction, such as a purchase item and other purchasing information.The resource challenge may be any format that can uniquely identify aparticular transaction, and thus need not be generated by the resourceitself. As used herein, the term “accessing” a resource challenge mayinclude resource challenges that are received from the resource,received from another source, and/or generated by device accessing theresource challenge.

The method additionally includes sending the resource challenge to anidentity repository (314). In one embodiment, the access device mayadditionally provide an interface for the user to select a user account.Interface may present a list of registered users from which the user mayselect his/her account. The interface may also provide an option to adda new user to the list of users authorized and the access device.

In one embodiment, the access device may package the resource challengein a second data packet before it is sent to the identity repository.The second data packet may be encrypted deterministically using a knownalgorithm, such as SDK, and converted into a base-64 format. The seconddata packet may include the resource's domain name, the hostname fromthe callback URL (SITE) and a list of attribute names requested by theresource. In one embodiment, the list of attribute names may beconverted into a list of individually-encrypted and base-64 convertedattribute names (EATTR). This may allow the identity repository to lookup individual attributes without needing to decrypt their names at theidentity resource.

The second data packet may further include a “cross” Boolean value thatis true if the hostname from the callback URL is not a hostname withinthe resource's domain name (CROSS). In one embodiment, the access deviceconstructs a JSON object to send to the identity repository. The JSONobject may include the contents of the second data packet, including anencrypted domain name, the hostname from the callback URL, the crossvalue, the nonce, the individually-encrypted attribute names, the LoAmode requirements, the Global User ID (GUID) for the user, the Device ID(DEVID), and a sequence value assigned to the transaction. In otherembodiments, the second data packet may additional values or may omitsome of the values listed above. The JSON object may further include asignature using the Access Device Signature Key Pair (ADS) listed inTable 1.

At this point, the access device may occasionally require additionalinformation from the resource. For example, the access device mayrequest information from the resource indicating whether or not theaccess device is registered with the resource. The access device mayderive the site-specific User ID (UID) for use in the transaction withthe resource. In one embodiment, the UID may be derived using theresource's domain name along with the Access Master Key (AMK) fromTable 1. Note that this value may be the same every time the accessdevice transacts with the particular resource. The resource can look upthe LID and send an indication of whether or not the account isregistered with the resource. The access device can then forward thisindication to the identity repository.

The method further includes receiving, from the identity repository, afirst signed resource challenge (316). In one embodiment, the firstsigned resource challenge is signed by the identity repository. Theoperations of the identity repository for signing the first resourcechallenge will be described in more detail below in relation to FIG. 4.The first signed resource challenge can be signed using a private keystored/derived at the identity repository that is associated with apublic key stored by the resource. For example, if the resourcechallenge comprises a nonce, the signed resource challenge can comprisethe nonce signed by the Repository Identity Signature Key Pair (RIS)listed in Table 1.

In one embodiment, the first signed resource challenge may be includedin a third data packet. The third data packet may include the signednonce, along with a set of name/value pairs for any requested andauthorized attributes. The name/value pairs can be associated with thelist of attribute names sent in the second data packet to the identityrepository. For example, the list of attribute names might include areference to a field named “address.” In response, the third data packetreturned from the identity repository may include a name/value paircomprising “555 Hollywood St.” In order to maintain security, thename/value pairs can be encrypted at the identity repository and laterunencrypted only at the access device or the resource.

In one embodiment, the third data packet from the identity repositoryfurther includes the public key associated with the RIS that was used tosign the nonce. In some cases, it may be necessary to send the encryptednonce along with the public key to the resource. This may be true ifthis is the first interaction with the resource or if the resource haslost the public keys associated with the GUID.

The method also includes signing the resource challenge to generate asecond signed resource challenge (318). In one embodiment, the accessdevice decrypts the list of name/value pairs and uses the AccessIdentity Signature (AIS) private key to sign an object including thehostname from the callback URL and the nonce. In one particularembodiment, the AIS key pair is not stored on the access device but israther derived when needed. The AIS key pair may be derived using a keyderivation function (KDF). The KDF can use at least the Access DeviceKey (ADK) and the resource's domain name to derive a private and publickey for each resource.

The KDF may be used to generate key pairs for signing and verifying theresource challenge. It may be useful to derive keys as they are neededrather than store them in order to save memory space and enhancesecurity. This may be particularly true for keys used to sign theresource challenges, which will exist for each user-resource pair. Inone embodiment, the access device public key and the identity repositorypublic key can be associated exclusively with each resource. Accessdevices with numerous users and numerous websites could otherwise end upstoring thousands of large encryption keys. Although many KDFs exist,the KDF used by one particular embodiment comprises the feedback modespecified in NIST SP800-108 section 5.2 using HMAC-SHA256 as its PRF Asinput arguments, this KDF uses a master key (such as the ADK or theRUK), a label comprising a short string differentiating the purpose ofdifferent derived keys from the same master key, a context stringindicating the resource name or purpose that is unique to each key to begenerated, an initialization vector that may be set to zero, and anumber of output bits (normally 128 bits for symmetric keys, and 256bits for ECDSA private keys). For example, the AIS private key could bederived with a function call comprising “KDF” (ADK, “ais”,“www.domain_name.com”, 256).

In one embodiment, the access device may determine whether a particularLoA mode requirement has been met before signing the resource challenge.The LoA requirement may originate with the resource, the access device,the identity repository, or set of user preferences stored on the accessdevice or at the identity repository. For example, the access device mayrequire a PIN be received from a control device before it will sign theresource challenge. In another example, a user preference may specifythat a password be entered for transactions exceeding a dollar thresholdamount. Unless a correct password is received from a user, the accessdevice may refuse to sign the resource challenge.

The method additionally includes sending an authorization for thevirtual identity to the resource through the network (320). In oneembodiment, the authorization includes the first signed resourcechallenge and the second signed resource challenge. The first signedresource challenge may comprise the signed nonce from the identityrepository, and the second signed resource challenge may comprise thesigned nonce from the access device. In one embodiment, a public keyassociated with each signed resource challenge is also sent to theresource. This may include the AIS public key from the access device andthe RIS public key from the identity repository. These public keys aretypically not required by the resource; however, sending them with thesigned resource challenges may be useful during a first transaction orin cases where the resource no longer has access to these public keys.This may eliminate future communications that would otherwise need totake place to transfer the public keys.

In one embodiment, the method may additionally include operations forregistering an account with the resource. These operations may takeplace before the steps of method shown in FIG. 3 are executed. Forexample, registering with the resource may include sending an accessdevice public key to the resource, as well as sending an identityrepository public key to the resource. As described earlier, the accessdevice public key can be associated with an access device private keythat is used by the access device to sign the resource challenge (i.e.,the AIS key pair). Similarly, the identity repository public key can beassociated with an identity repository private key that is used by theidentity repository to sign the resource challenge (i.e., the RIS keypair). In one embodiment, the access device public key and the identityrepository public key are sent to the resource as a part of aregistration process prior to the request. Again, these public keys maybe sent to the resource along with the signed resource challenges aspart of a first transaction.

In one embodiment, authorizing the transaction may further require anOOB authorization. This may comprise obtaining a signature of theresource challenge by another user device, namely a control device. Likethe access device, the control device may comprise any computer system,such as a smart phone. In one embodiment, the access device and thecontrol device may be the same physical device. For example, the accessdevice may be a smart phone where the user is operating a web browser toaccess a website. The control device can be the same smart phone, andthe request for the resource challenge may be sent to an app operatingon the smart phone or to another browser window.

The identity repository may determine that an authorization is requiredfrom an OOB device. In this case, the method may further includereceiving a third signed resource challenge from the identityrepository, where the third signed resource challenge comprises theresource challenge signed by a control device. The method may alsoinclude sending the third signed resource challenge to the resourcethrough the network to authorize using the virtual identity for aninteraction with the resource. The operation of the control device willbe discussed in greater detail below in relation to FIG. 5.

Next, the operations performed by the identity repository will bedescribed. FIG. 4 illustrates a simplified flowchart 400 illustrating amethod of authorizing a virtual identity by an identity repository foran interaction between an access device and a resource, according to anembodiment of the present invention. The method includes accessing, atthe identity repository, a resource challenge that is acceptable to theresource (410). Typically, the access device first receives the resourcechallenge from the resource. This may be the same resource challengethat was, or will be, signed by the access device. The resourcechallenge may be generated by the resource and sent from the accessdevice, generated by the access device, and/or generated by the identityrepository.

In one embodiment, an encryption key and the resource challenge arereceived as part of the data packet from the access device. The datapacket may further include the data described above that was sent fromthe access device in relation to FIG. 3. For example, the data packetmay include the hostname from the callback URL, the resource's domainname, and a list of attribute names. Each of these values, includingeach of the attribute names, can be encrypted deterministically usingSDK and converted into, for example, a base-64 format. The data packetmay further include the Boolean cross value, the nonce, the LoA moderequested by the resource, the GUID, the DEVID, and the sequence valueassigned to the transaction.

Continuing with this particular embodiment, the identity repository canverify that the DEVID corresponds to an access device enrolled with theidentity repository and associated with the GUID. The identityrepository can also verify that the GUID and the DEVID have not beendisabled. Furthermore, the identity repository can check the sequencevalue transmitted from the access device to a sequence value stored inthe identity repository and associated with the DEVID. If the receivedsequence value matches the stored sequence value, the stored sequencevalue can be incremented. In one embodiment, the data packet sent fromthe access device can be in the form of a JSON object that is encryptedusing the ADS private key. The identity repository can verify thesignature on the request using the ADS public key stored in therepository for the GUID.

In some embodiments, circumstances may cause the identity repository torequire additional information from the access device. For example, theBoolean cross value represents a determination as to whether thehostname from the callback URL is not a hostname within the resource'sdomain name. If the Boolean cross value is true, the identity repositorycan look up the resource's domain name in a relationship tableassociated with the user to determine whether a relationship has beenpreviously established between the callback URL and the resource'sdomain name. If no relationship has been established, the access devicemay need to provide confirmation that the user is willing to share theUID, along with public keys and attributes with a site in a differentdomain. In one embodiment, the access device can receive this indicationfrom the identity repository and prompt the user to confirm theirwillingness to share information associated with the resource with thecallback URL. If the user declines, the authentication process can end.

In one embodiment, the identity repository can both select and enforcethe proper LoA mode requirements. LoA modes may be specified by theresource, the access device, the identity repository, and/or userpreferences stored on the identity repository. The identity repositorycan select which of these LoA modes should be enforced on thetransaction. For example, the identity repository may determine that themost restrictive, or highest, LoA requirement should be enforced.

In one embodiment, the LoA mode may require that a user provides apassword to the access device in this case, the identity repository canreturn an HTML response, such as a “202 Accepted” status response with aJSON object containing a password nonce corresponding to theauthentication. The user can provide the password to the access device,which then signs the password nonce using the password, and returns thesigned password nonce to the identity repository for verification.

In one embodiment, the architecture is set up so that all of the userdata stored at the identity repository is encrypted, while theencryption key is stored locally on the user's device. This creates anarms-length separation between the data and the means for accessing thedata. Even if the user's device were compromised, the attacker would nothave access to the encrypted data because it is securely stored at theidentity repository. More importantly, an attacker breaching theidentity repository would not gain any useful information because anydata stored therein would be encrypted, and the associated encryptionkeys would be stored on the individual users' devices. This preventsmassive data compromises from resulting from a single security breach atthe identity repository. In one embodiment, the identity repository is afully encrypted data store, and any data stored thereon is encrypted.The associated encryption keys are stored remotely in other locationsand on other devices that are not controlled or operated by the identityrepository.

Regarding the attributes fields, the encryption takes place on the userdevice. The request does not need to include a key to decrypt the fieldvalues at the identity repository. A user module operating on the accessdevice can be configured to encrypt a field associated with the requestfrom the resource. The encrypted field is then sent to the identityrepository. The identity repository is further configured to retrievethe encrypted data by comparing the encrypted data to the encryptedfield. For example, to represent a name, the data associated with theinformation includes a field-value pair of <name><“Steve”>. If theresource only needs the user's name, then the access device can encryptthe field value of “name” and send this to the identity repository. Theidentity repository can then compare the encrypted “name” fields withthe other encrypted fields in the encrypted data and return only theassociated encrypted value (“Steve”). In another embodiment, the accessdevice simply requests all of the encrypted data.

The method also includes accessing an identity repository private key(412). In some embodiments, the identity repository private key may beaccessed using the encryption key that may have been received from theaccess device. The terms “encryption key” and/or “cryptographic key” maydescribe both a key and/or information used to generate a key by a KDF.In one embodiment, the identity repository may decrypt the identityrepository private key using the encryption key sent from the accessdevice. In another embodiment, accessing the identity repository privatekey may comprise deriving the private key using the KDF functiondescribed earlier. For example, the encryption key sent from the accessdevice may be the encrypted domain name of the resource. The encrypteddomain name can be used as a parameter in the KDF function, along withthe Repository User Key (RUK) listed in Table 1 and stored on theidentity repository.

The method additionally includes signing the resource challenge usingthe identity repository private key to generate a first signed resourcechallenge (414). In one embodiment, the identity repository can use theidentity repository private key derived from encrypted domain name ofthe resource by the KDF function to sign the nonce sent from theresource. Additionally, in order to enforce the appropriate LoA moderequirements, the identity repository may refuse to sign the resourcechallenge if one or more of the LoA mode requirements are not met. Forexample, if the LoA mode specified by the resource requires a passwordfrom the user, and the password entered was incorrect, the identityrepository can refuse to sign the resource challenge. Consequently, theresource can have confidence that the specified LoA mode has beenhonored if it receives a signed resource challenge from the identityrepository.

The method further includes sending the first signed resource challengeto the access device (416) The first signed resource challenge may besent as part of yet another data packet that includes the encryptedname/value pairs for the requested and authorized attributes, along withthe identity repository public key. The identity repository public keycan be associated with the identity repository private key used to signthe resource challenge Again, the public keys will typically be storedat the resource but may be sent with the signed resource challenge as aprecaution or if this is the first time the access device is using thisidentity with the resource.

In some cases, the LoA mode (as specified by the resource, accessdevice, or preferences stored by the identity repository) may require anOOB authorization. In one embodiment, this may correspond to receivingan authorization and/or a PIN from a control device, such as asmartphone. Therefore, the method may optionally further include sendingthe resource challenge to a control device and receiving a signedresource challenge, sometimes referred to as the “third signed resourcechallenge,” from the control device. The identity repository can thensend the third signed resource challenge to the access device, which cansubsequently forward the third signed resource challenge to theresource.

In one embodiment, multiple control devices can be associated with asingle user account. In this case, the identity repository can issuepush notifications to all control devices associated with the useraccount. Alternatively, the identity repository can issue pushnotifications to a preferred subset of the control devices specified bythe user preferences. If an OOB authorization is required, and nocontrol devices are registered with the account, the identity repositorycan return, for example, a “403 Forbidden” error message to the accessdevice.

After the push notifications have been sent to one or more of theregistered control devices, the identity repository can await aconnection from any of the control devices. In one embodiment, theconnection can be in the form of a signed POST containing a signedJSON-formatted object containing the GUID of the user, the DEVID of thedevice, and a sequence number. The JSON-formatted object can be signedusing the Control Device Signature key (CDS) from Table 1. The identityrepository can then verify the signature of the JSON-formatted object.Additionally, the identity repository can verify that the DEVIDcorresponds to a current control device that is associated with the GUIDand that the sequence number matches a value stored by the identityrepository for this control device.

If any of these verifications fail, the identity repository can return a“403 Forbidden” error to the control device and/or the access device. Ifall of these verifications are successful, then the identity repositorycan increment the stored value for the sequence number for this DEVID.Next, the identity repository can send a packet of information to thecontrol device for authorization. In one embodiment, the packet ofinformation can include one or more of the following: the nonce, theencrypted domain name, the encrypted callback URL, the LoA mode, and/orthe Boolean value indicating whether the user has previously registeredwith the resource.

The packet of information may also include a new nonce used for PINverification with the control device. If the LoA mode requires a PIN tobe entered at the control device, the control device can make suchrequest from the user. For example, the control device can display theresource's domain name to the user, along with a prompt to enter a pinauthorizing the transaction. The control device may accept the PIN fromthe user and may then sign a packet comprising at least the new nonceusing the PIN. In one embodiment, the PIN is “salted” with a value thatis known by the identity repository, and the result is used to sign thepacket. This can effectively eliminate the threat of a brute forceattack against the PIN, which may in turn allow a user to use shorterand/or more easily guessed PINs. This also prevents the actual PIN fromneeding to be stored anywhere other than the control device andeliminates the need to transmit the PIN between the control device andthe identity repository.

The signed packet comprising at least the new nonce can then be sentfrom the control device to the identity repository. The identityrepository can then verify the signature. Again, if the control devicedenies the authentication or the PIN verification fails, the identityrepository can return, for example, a “403 Forbidden” error to theaccess device. If the control device approves the authentication and thePIN verification is successful, then the control device can access orderive the private key of the Control Identity Signature keypair (CIS)from Table 1. In some embodiments, this private key is not stored on thecontrol device Instead, this private key is derived using a keyderivation function with the Access Device Key (ADK) and the resource'sdomain name as inputs. If the Boolean value indicating whether the userhas previously registered with the resource is false, then the controldevice can derive the public key for the CIS keypair as well.

The control device can then sign the nonce with the CIS private key andreturn the signed nonce (the third signed resource challenge) to theidentity repository. In one embodiment, the control device can also usethe CIS private key to sign an object that contains the nonce, alongwith the hostname from the callback URL Additionally, the control devicecan send the CIS public key to the identity repository.

Turning now to a discussion of the transaction from the perspective ofthe control device, a software module may operate on the control deviceto perform the functions described above. In one embodiment, the controldevice may comprise a smart phone. The smart phone may include anapplication (“app”) that operates on the smart phone. The app may bemade available for download to the smart phone via an online app store.An entity associated with the identity repository may provide the app tothe online app store, which in turn may provide the app to the controldevice of the user. FIG. 5 illustrates a simplified flowchart 500illustrating a method for authorizing a virtual identity using a controldevice for an interaction between an access device and a resource,according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method includesaccessing, at the control device, a resource challenge that isacceptable to the resource (510). According to one embodiment, theresource challenge can originate with the resource. As described abovein relation to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, the resource challenge may comprise anonce and may be sent along with additional data fields, such as theresource's domain name. In other embodiments, the resource challenge canoriginate with the control device, the access device, and/or theidentity repository. In order to be acceptable to the resource, someembodiments may use resource challenges that can semi-uniquely identifya transaction.

The method may also include signing the resource challenge to generate asigned resource challenge (512). In some embodiments, this may bereferred to as the third signed resource challenge. The resourcechallenge may be signed using the procedure described in relation toFIG. 4.

In one embodiment, the control device can prompt the user to authorizethe transaction. Information describing the interaction between theaccess device and the resource can be received by the control device.For example, the information might include a description of a purchasetransaction comprising a product, a vendor, a price, and so forth. Thecontrol device can provide an indication to the user that includes theinformation describing the interaction. For example, the control devicecan display a pop-up window illustrating the interaction details and mayprovide a means for the user to either authorize or reject theinteraction. In response, the control device can receive an indicationfrom the user that grants permission to use the virtual identity in theinteraction between an access device and a resource. Alternatively, theuser may reject the request to authorize the interaction.

In addition to authorizing the interaction, the user of the controldevice may be required to prove that they are present and/or authorizedto use the control device, according to one embodiment. Therefore, themethod may further include operations for receiving a PIN,cryptographically salting the PIN, and using the results to sign a newnonce sent from the identity repository. Specifically, the method mayinclude receiving a control device challenge from the identityrepository, receiving a personal identifier from a user, signing thecontrol device challenge using at least the personal identifier togenerate a signed control device challenge, and sending the signedcontrol device challenge to the identity repository to verify that thecontrol device is authorized to sign the resource challenge. Oneembodiment describing this process is also discussed above in relationto FIG. 4.

According to one embodiment, the personal identifier that is receivedfrom a user may comprise a PIN. However, in other embodiments, thepersonal identifier can comprise any token associated with the user,such as a password, hardware dongle, flash drive, and/or the like.

The method further includes sending the signed resource challenge to theidentity repository (514). As described above, the signed resourcechallenge may be sent as a part of a larger data packet includingadditional data. The larger data packet may be signed using the CISprivate key. The larger data packet may also include the CIS public key.

Turning now to discussion of the transaction from the perspective of theresource, a software module may operate on a server to interact with theaccess device FIG. 6 illustrates a simplified flow chart illustrating amethod of verifying, by a resource, that a virtual identity isauthorized for use in an interaction between an access device and theresource, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Themethod may include receiving, at the resource, a request from the accessdevice to use the virtual identity (610). In one embodiment, theresource may be a website, and the website can provide a button thatallows a user to, with a single click, log into the website using theidentity management system. The button can replace, or can be displayedalongside with, traditional username and password HTML fields.

In some embodiments, in response to receiving the request, the methodmay also include transmitting a resource challenge from the resource tothe access device (612). As described above, in one embodiment theresource challenge may comprise a nonce. The resource challenge may alsobe sent as part of a larger data package. The larger data package mayadditionally comprise the resource's domain name, names and attributeprofiles that are being requested by the resource, an LoA mode, and/or acallback URL to which the response should be POSTed when theauthentication completes. In one embodiment, the callback URL can be anSSL (https) URL. The resource challenge or other information sent in theoptional larger data package can be used by the access device togenerate signatures for authorization. Note that in other embodiments,transmitting a resource challenge from the resource to the access devicemay not be necessary. In these embodiments, the resource challenge maybe derived or generated at the access device.

The method can also include receiving information from the access device(614). According to one embodiment, the information may comprise a firstsigned resource challenge signed by an identity repository and a secondsigned resource challenge signed by the access device. The first signedresource challenge and the second signed resource challenge can besigned by the identity repository and the access device, respectively,in a number of different ways. The first signed resource challenge andthe second signed resource challenge can be based on a resourcechallenge that is acceptable to the resource. The resource challenge maybe generated at the resource, at the access device, or at other devicesin the identity management system. In one embodiment, the first signedresource challenge and the second signed resource challenge may besigned as described above in relation to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4.

In one embodiment, the LoA mode transmitted by the resource to theaccess device can specify that and OOB authorization should occur. Forexample, the LoA mode may specify that a PIN should be received by acontrol device. In this embodiment, the information received from theaccess device may additionally comprise a third signed resourcechallenge that was signed by the control device. Again, the third signedresource challenge may be signed as described above in relation to FIG.3 and FIG. 4.

The method may further include determining one or more publiccryptographic keys associated with the virtual identity (616) In oneembodiment, the one or more public cryptographic keys were previouslytransmitted to the resource as part of a registration process. In otherwords, the public and private key pairs used to sign resource challengesfor the resource may have been derived earlier by the access device, theidentity repository, and/or the control device. When registering withthe website, the one or more public cryptographic keys may have beentransmitted to the resource and stored at the resource for subsequentauthorizations. In one embodiment, the first time a user attempts toaccess a resource using the virtual identity, this action mayautomatically include a registration process with the website where theone or more public cryptographic keys are transmitted. To determinewhich public cryptographic keys are associated with the virtualidentity, the resource can, for example, store the one or more publiccryptographic keys for all of its customers in a table that is indexedby the user's UID.

In another embodiment, the resource may not have the one or more publiccryptographic keys stored locally. As described above, the informationreceived from the access device may include the one or more publiccryptographic keys that can be used to verify the signatures on thesigned resource challenges. In this case, determining the one or morepublic cryptographic keys associated with the virtual identity maysimply comprise using the one or more public cryptographic keys thatwere sent with the information from the access device.

The method may additionally include determining that the first signedresource challenge is valid using the one or more public cryptographickeys (618) and determining that the second signed resource challenge isvalid using the one or more public cryptographic keys (620). In oneembodiment, a nonce sent by the resource to the access device may havebeen signed by both the access device and the identity repository. Inanother embodiment, the nonce may be part of a larger data package,which has been signed by both the access device and the identityrepository. In another embodiment, a separate copy of either the nonceor the larger data packet may have each been individually signed by theaccess device and/or the identity repository. Determining that thesignatures are valid may include decrypting the nonce and/or larger datapacket using the one or more public cryptographic keys that werepreviously determined.

In embodiments where an OOB authorization was required, the method mayadditionally include determining that the third signed resourcechallenge is valid using the one or more public cryptographic keys.

The method may also include determining that the virtual identity isauthorized for use in the interaction between the access device and theresource (622). For example, if the two/three signatures all aredetermined to be valid, the virtual identity can be authorized. In oneembodiment, the identity repository can be used to enforce any LoA moderequirements specified by the resource. For example, one of therequirements may include verifying that a personal identifier has beenreceived from the access device to verify that the access device hasbeen authorized by a user to sign the resource challenge. If theresource determines that the signature provided by the identityrepository is valid, then the resource can be assured that such apersonal identifier was provided and determined to be valid by theidentity repository. In other words, the identity repository canwithhold its signature unless the LoA mode requirements have been met.As described above, the LoA mode requirements to be enforced may beselected from those provided by the resource, the access device, thecontrol device, or according to user preferences stored at the identityrepository.

It should be appreciated that the specific steps illustrated in FIGS.3-6 provide particular methods of authorizing the use of a virtualidentity according to various embodiments of the present invention.Other sequences of steps may also be performed according to alternativeembodiments. For example, alternative embodiments of the presentinvention may perform the steps outlined above in a different order.Moreover, the individual steps illustrated in FIGS. 3-6 may includemultiple sub-steps that may be performed in various sequences asappropriate to the individual step. Furthermore, additional steps may beadded or removed depending on the particular applications One ofordinary skill in the art would recognize many variations,modifications, and alternatives.

In order to clarify the order of the transaction flows described inFIGS. 3-6, FIG. 7 illustrates a simplified flowchart 700 ofcommunications within a system for online identity management, accordingto one embodiment. Flowchart 700 is not meant to be exhaustive, and anumber of possible transactions, including some described elsewhereherein, have been left out for brevity. In one embodiment, a series oftransactions may begin with the resource 702 sending at least a resourcechallenge to the access device 704 (710). In one embodiment, JavaScriptcan be retrieved from the identity repository 706 (712) that can be usedto deterministically encrypt using the SDK data packet to be sent fromthe access device 704 to the repository 706. Where multiple useraccounts exist on the same access device, the access device 704 canpresent a user list to the user (714). In response, the user may enter aselection from the user list to the access device 704 (716).

Using the selected user account, the access device 704 can send at leastthe resource challenge and a value for decrypting information stored inthe identity repository 706 to the identity repository 706 (718). In oneembodiment, the access device 704 can send one or more decryption keysto decrypt information on the identity repository. Alternatively, theaccess device 704 can send information to be used to generate one ormore decryption keys to the identity repository 706.

In cases where the chosen LoA mode requires authorization and/or apersonal identifier to be received by the access device 704, theidentity repository 706 can send an access device challenge to theaccess device 704 (720). The access device may prompt the user forauthorization (722). The user can provide a response that eitherauthorizes the virtual identity or transaction or rejects such (724).Additionally or alternatively, the access device 704 may provide a userprompt for a personal identifier, such as a password (726). In response,the user may provide a personal identifier to the access device 704(728). The password may be salted according to the methods describedelsewhere in this disclosure and used to provide an authentication tothe identity repository 706 (730).

In embodiments and situations where an OOB authorization is required,the resource challenge can be sent from the identity repository 706 tothe control device 708 (732). The control device 708 may prompt the userfor a PIN (736). In response, the user may provide a PIN to the controldevice 708 (738). The control device may then send the signed resourcechallenge to the identity repository 706 (740).

After the identity repository 706 has determined that all of the LoArequirements have been satisfied, the identity repository 706 can sendat least the esource challenges that have been signed by the controldevice 708 and the identity repository 706 (742). The access device 704can forward the signed resource challenges received from the identityrepository 706 along with the resource challenge that has been signed bythe access device 704 itself to the resource 702 (744).

It should be noted that multiple parts of the transactions described inthis disclosure have not been included in FIG. 7. For example, thecontrol device 708 may prompt the user for authorization of thetransaction or use of the virtual identity. In response, the user mayprovide such authorization. Also, more information than has beendescribed or shown may be passed between the different entities during atransaction. For example, the resource challenge may be transmitted aspart of a larger data packet that includes additional data fields thatcan be used by each entity, such as the resources domain name, a list ofattributes, and/or the like.

It will be understood in light of this disclosure that the examples andembodiments described herein are for illustrative purposes only and thatvarious modifications or changes in light thereof will be suggested topersons skilled in the art and are to be included within the spirit andpurview of this application and scope of the appended claims.

Pairing Unregistered Devices

Some embodiments of the present invention relate to technologies tofacilitate pairing unregistered devices with an existing virtualidentity. Technologies related to embodiments of the present inventionprovide a method and system for transferring secret data to theunregistered device as a part of the registration process, withoutexposing the secret data to any of the intermediary repositories. Alsoprovided are methods and systems for verifying the identity of a user ofthe unregistered device, again without exposing a passcode, such as apassword and/or PIN, to any of the intermediary repositories.

Consistent with the remainder of this disclosure, a virtual identity maybe managed and used by a number of different devices. According to oneembodiment, the virtual identity may be managed by an identityrepository. The identity repository may include one or more serversoperating at a location that is geographically remote from most userdevices. In one embodiment, the identity repository may storeinformation associated with the virtual identity of each user in anencrypted format, such that if the identity repository is compromised,the personal information of each user remains secure. Therefore, themeans by which the personal information can be decrypted, such as adecryption key, can be stored in a separate location away from theidentity repository.

In one embodiment, the identity repository may be authorized tocommunicate with one or more user devices that are registered with aparticular virtual identity. By way of example, the identity repositorymay be associated with a number of access devices and/or a number ofcontrol devices associated with each virtual identity. In order to usethe virtual identity in a transaction, a user may provide identifiersand/or credentials to the identity repository in order to gain thesignature of the identity repository or to retrieve any of the personaldata in its encrypted format. For example, the identity repository maysign digital challenges provided by relying parties, such as websitesparticipating in the transaction.

As part of this process, the identity repository may need to identify adevice being used in the transaction. For example, a user may log onto aretail website using a desktop computer. In this case, the desktopcomputer could be considered an access device. The retail website mayprovide a challenge to be signed by the access device and by theidentity repository. When the access device passes the challenge to theidentity repository for a signature, the access device can also providea user identifier and/or a device identifier. The identity repositorycan then use the identifier(s) to access a particular virtual identitystored at the identity repository. If the identity repository is unableto identify the access device using the provided device identifier, thenthe identity repository may refuse to provide a signature.

Verifying the device identifier for any or all devices used in atransaction can be an important way of preventing fraud. For example, inorder to access a virtual identity, both a valid user identifier and avalid device identifier can be presented, in addition to any othersignatures required by the virtual identity. If a valid user identifieris detected without a valid device identifier, this may indicate thatsomeone may be attempting to use a virtual identity withoutauthorization. Therefore, a method for securely registering user deviceswith a virtual identity is presented below.

When registering anew user device, it may be important to adhere to theprinciples that contribute to the security of the virtual identityitself. First, encrypted data should be stored separately from thecryptographic keys that can be used to access the encrypted data. Keysshould not be transmitted with encrypted data, nor should both the keysand the data be accessible to an intermediary at anytime. Specific toone embodiment, the keys for decrypting data stored on the identityrepository should not generally be accessible to the identityrepository. Furthermore, keys used by each user device to signchallenges during a transaction should also not be accessible to theidentity repository Therefore, during the registration process aregistered device will need to provide secret information securely tothe unregistered device without exposing that secret information to theidentity repository.

It typically is not feasible to ask a user to manually transfer secretsbetween devices by reading the secrets from one device and entering themin another device. Transferring secret information may often involvesharing cryptographic keys that can typically exceed 128 bits in length.These cryptographic keys may typically be stored in an encrypted formaton registered devices, and for security reasons, should not be displayedto users. Furthermore, given the length and complexity of mostcryptographic keys, manual transfer of these secrets will often involveuser errors that prevent the registration process from succeeding.

Additionally, a user may have a passcode, such as a password and/or aPIN, for their associated access devices and/or control devices. Likethe keys for decrypting secret data, the passcode should not betransmitted in such a way that it is exposed to an intermediary such asthe identity repository. At the same time, some embodiments may requirethat a user verify his/her identity on the unregistered device prior toregistration. For example, a user may be required to input a PIN to anunregistered control device, and that PIN may need to be verified beforethe control device is registered. The difficulty lies in accomplishingthis verification process without exposing this information to theidentity repository. Some of the embodiments described herein may solvethese and many other problems.

FIG. 8 illustrates a block diagram 800 of a system for pairing andunregistered device with a virtual identity, according to oneembodiment. Block diagram 800 also illustrates a subset of the possibletransactions that may take place during the registration process. Itwill be understood that additional information may be exchanged, andadditional communications may take place in various embodiments. Blockdiagram 800 merely represents a simplified overview to present the basicoperation of various embodiments. An identity repository 808 is providedto store and manage secret information associated with a virtualidentity. A registered device 806 may be registered to a user of thevirtual identity, and secret information 807 may be stored on theregistered device 806. In one embodiment, the registered device 806 maybe categorized as an access device and may comprise a personal computer,a laptop, a tablet computer, a smart phone, a workstation, a thinclient, an automated software process, and/or the like. Similarly, theuser of the virtual identity may have access to an unregistered device,which may comprise any of the technologies enumerated above, along withany other computing device available to a user.

Also illustrated in FIG. 8 is an additional component referred to as apairing repository 804. Similar to the identity repository 808, thepairing repository 804 may operate on one or more servers that can becommunicatively coupled to both the registered device 806 and theunregistered device 802. According to one embodiment, the pairingrepository 804 may be co-located with the identity repository 808. Inanother embodiment, the pairing repository 804 is located geographicallyremote from the identity repository 808. In another embodiment, thepairing repository 804 may be owned, associated with, or operated by, afirst entity; while the identity repository 808 may be owned, associatedwith, or operated by, a second entity. In some embodiments, the pairingrepository 804 is logically separated from the identity repository 808such that information that is transmitted from the unregistered device802 and/or the registered device 806 to the pairing repository 804 isnot known by, or available to, the identity repository 808. In otherwords, information transmitted between the unregistered device 802 andthe registered device 806 via the pairing repository 804 would remainsecret from the identity repository 808 unless otherwise disclosed, andvice versa.

In order to transmit the secret information 807 rom the registereddevice 806 to be unregistered device 802, two different values may begenerated for the transaction. According to one embodiment, these twovalues may include a pairing code (PAIRING) and a pairing nonce(PNONCE). Generally, the pairing code and the pairing nonce may begenerated by either the unregistered device 802 or the pairingrepository 804. Furthermore, the unregistered device 802 and the pairingrepository 804 may initially share their knowledge of the pairing codeand the pairing nonce (812). In one embodiment, however, the pairingcode and the pairing nonce are both generated by the pairing repository804 and transmitted to the unregistered device 802.

Next, the unregistered device 802 can display the pairing code to theuser. According to one embodiment, the purpose of the pairing code maybe to verify that the user of the registered device 806 also controls orhas access to the unregistered device 802. The pairing code may also beused as a transaction identifier as both devices interact with thepairing repository 804 and/or the identity repository 808. Generally,the pairing code may be a short combination of letters and/or numbersthat may be easily read from a screen and entered into the registereddevice 806. For example, the pairing code may comprise a string ofdigits such as “5178”, or may comprise a string of mixed numbers andcharacters such as “5OP81Z”. The user may read this pairing code fromthe unregistered device 802 and enter the pairing code into theregistered device 806 (814).

After receiving the pairing code, the registered device 806 may thensend a request to the pairing repository 804 that includes the pairingcode and an identity repository locator (HREPO). In some embodiments,different organizations may operate different identity repositories, andusers may transfer virtual identities between repositories. For example,a user may choose to transfer his/her virtual identity from an identityrepository operated by the federal government to a repository operatedby a private company Different identity repositories may operate usingcommon software specifications, and may present a standardized API tousers/devices. Therefore, it may be beneficial for the registered deviceto provide, for example, a URL to the pairing repository 804 that can betransmitted to the unregistered device 802 for completing the pairingprocess (816). If the location of the identity repository 808 is known,then this step may be omitted.

Using the pairing code, the pairing repository 804 may retrieve thepairing nonce associated with the unregistered device 802. The pairingnonce can then be transmitted to the registered device 806 (818). Atthis point, the registered device 806 can use the pairing code and thepairing nonce to generate an encryption key. Any key derivation function(KDF) known in the art may be used to generate the encryption key. Thisencryption key can be used to encrypt the secret information 807. Theencrypted secret information and pairing code can then be sent to theidentity repository 808 (820). Note that the identity repository 808does not have access to the pairing nonce. Therefore, even if theidentity repository 808 knows the KDF used to derive the encryption key,the identity repository 808 would be unable to do so without the pairingnonce as an input.

Next, the unregistered device 802 may optionally request and receive theidentity repository locator from the pairing repository 804 (822). Usingthe identity repository locator, the unregistered device 802 may send arequest to the identity repository 808 with the pairing code (822).Because the identity repository 808 received the pairing code from theregistered device 806, the identity repository 808 can match the requestfrom the unregistered device with the encrypted secret information fromthe registered device 806. In response, the identity repository 808 mayprovide the encrypted secret information to the unregistered device 802(824). The KDF used to generate the encryption key may at some point beshared with the unregistered device by the identity repository 808.Therefore the unregistered device 802 can use the pairing code and/orthe pairing nonce to generate a key that will decrypt the encryptedsecret information sent from the registered device 806. The secretinformation may be stored securely on the unregistered device 802 to beused in future transactions involving the virtual identity. Finally, theidentity repository 808 may associate the unregistered device 802 withthe virtual identity for use in future transactions, storing a deviceidentifier (DEVID) of the unregistered device 802. At this point theunregistered device 802 can become a registered device.

Note that in the transaction described above, one intermediary (thepairing repository 804) can be used to share the means for accessing thesecret information, while another intermediary (the identity repository808) is used to share the secret information itself. Furthermore, theunregistered device 802 is initially connected with a virtual identitywhen the user manually enters the pairing code into the registereddevice 806. Also note that passcode and/or identity verification is notillustrated in block diagram 800. Although in some embodiments passwordverification may be an integral part of the pairing process, theseadditional steps will be described separately in further detail belowfor the sake of clarity.

FIG. 9A illustrates a flowchart 900 a for a method of pairing anunregistered device for use with a virtual identity, according to oneembodiment. The method of flowchart 900 a may be carried out by apairing repository. The method may include receiving a request from theunregistered device (910). If the device being added is an accessdevice, the user may navigate to a webpage operated by the pairingrepository that contains JavaScript and prompts the user for a devicename (DEVNAME) by which the access device should be known, as well as apasscode for the user's account with the identity repository.Alternatively, if the device being added is a control device, the usermay interact with an identity repository software module operating onthe control device, such as an app on a smart phone. The software modulemay prompt the user for a DEVNAME and a passcode, such as a PIN.

The method may also include sending a pairing code and an identifier tothe unregistered device (912). In one embodiment, the pairing repositorymay create a pairing code comprising an n-digit pseudorandom number witha check digit. In one embodiment, n is 4 If more than 50% of the spaceof available pairing codes is in use, then n may be incremented by 1,and a pairing code may be chosen from the expanded space. For example,for n=3, if more than 500 pairing codes were in use, then n could beincremented to expand the pairing code space to 4 digits, i.e. 9999. Inone embodiment, if 50% of the space of nine-digit pairing codes isoccupied, an error may be returned to the user, such as a “503 ServiceUnavailable” error. If pairing codes are available, the pairingrepository can select a value at random from the pairing code space thatis not in use. A check digit can be calculated and appended to the endof the pairing code. In one embodiment, the check digit can becalculated by applying “digit weightings”, such as 3131313131, forexample, and calculating the sum of each digit times its weighting,modulo 10, with leading zeros added as needed. Generally, the pairingcode can be a short string of characters and/or digits that will be easyto remember and transfer between devices. Alternatively, the pairingcode can be an alphanumeric combination that approximates English wordsor sound combinations that can be remembered by a typical user.

The pairing repository may also select an identifier to be sent to theunregistered device. In one embodiment, the identifier may comprise thepairing nonce (PNONCE) described above. Although any format ortransmission method may be used to send the identifier and the pairingcode to the unregistered device, one specific embodiment returns a JSONobject containing the pairing code in decimal format (e.g., {“PAIRING”,“55580”}) and the identifier in base-64 format.

The next steps in the registration process may take place remotely fromthe pairing repository. In one embodiment, the pairing code may bedisplayed to the user of the control device. The user of the controldevice may then enter the pairing code into a registered device, such asan access device. Like the control device, the access device may run asoftware module provided by the pairing repository or the identityrepository when entering the pairing code. In another embodiment, theuser of the access device may navigate to a website operated by theidentity repository or the pairing repository. In response to receivingthe pairing code, the registered device may send a transmission to thepairing repository. In some embodiments, the pairing code may expireafter a predetermined time interval or after receiving a request fromthe registered device. In some embodiments, a large time delay may beacceptable, such as 1 hour, 6 hours, 12 hours, 24 hours, 36 hours, etc.

Consequently, the method may also include receiving the pairing code andoptionally an identity repository locator from a registered device(914). In one embodiment, the identity repository locator may comprisethe name of the user's home repository for identity management. Theidentity repository locator may comprise a URL or a domain name. If thepairing repository determines that the pairing code matches a valid andcurrently active pairing code, the pairing repository may send theidentifier to the registered device (916). In one embodiment, this maycomprise sending the pairing nonce to the registered device. In anotherembodiment, additional information may also be provided to theregistered device including, a pairing type that indicates whether theunregistered device is a control device or an access device, and adevice name (DEVNAME) provided by the unregistered device.Alternatively, if the pairing repository determined that the pairingcode does not match a valid and/or currently active pairing code, anerror may be returned to the user, such as a “404 Not Found error.”

At this point, the registered device may derive an encryption key, orpairing key (KP), that can be used to encrypt secret information. In oneembodiment, a KDF may be used that accepts an input comprising at leastthe pairing nonce. In another embodiment, the KDF may also accept thepairing code. If both the pairing code and the pairing nonce are used,these two values may be concatenated and/or combined using various knownmethods if the KDF only accepts a single seed input. In one embodiment,the secret information may comprise a “salt” value that is used toverify passcodes as will be described further below. The secretinformation may further comprise cryptographic keys that can be used tosign future transactions or to generate additional cryptographic keysthat can be used to sign future transactions. In one embodiment, thesecret information may comprise a Shared Device Key (SDK) that is sharedbetween all access devices and control devices associated with thevirtual identity. The SDK can be kept secret from the intermediaryrepositories in most embodiments. Therefore, the encryption key derivedfrom the pairing code and/or the pairing nonce may encrypt at least thesalt value and the SDK, according to these embodiments.

The method may also optionally include sending the identity repositorylocator to the unregistered device (918). In one embodiment, a virtualidentity may be stored on various different identity repositories, andthe identity repository locator may be used to select among theavailable identity repositories. In another embodiment, the identityrepository locator is simply a text string that is inserted into an HTTP“Get”. In yet another embodiment, the identity repository locator may beprovided to the unregistered device as a part of installing a softwaremodule from the identity repository or from the pairing repository. Inother words, this step in the method may be carried out before theunregistered device makes a registration request.

In order to retrieve the identity repository locator, some embodimentsmay have the unregistered device send the pairing nonce and/or thepairing code to the pairing repository as an identifier. If the pairingrepository determines that the pairing nonce and/or pairing code is avalid and currently active value, the pairing repository may send theidentity repository locator in response. In another embodiment, thepairing repository may redirect the request to the identity repository,without explicitly sending the identity repository identifier to theunregistered device. The redirect may also include the pairing code.

FIG. 9B illustrates a flowchart 900 b of a method for pairing anunregistered device with a virtual identity, according to oneembodiment. The method in flowchart 900 b may be carried out by theidentity repository, whereas the method in flowchart 900 a may have beencarried out by the pairing repository. The method may include receivingthe pairing code and secret information from the registered device (920)In one embodiment, the secret information is encrypted using theencryption key derived from at least the pairing nonce. Upon receipt,the identity repository may store the secret information in a datastructure that is indexed by the pairing code. Additionally, the pairingcode and/or the secret information may expire after a predetermined timeinterval, after which these values may be securely deleted from theidentity repository.

The secret information and pairing code may be stored on the identityrepository until a request is made from the unregistered device. Themethod may include receiving the pairing code in a transmissionassociated with the unregistered device (922) The pairing code may besent as part of a redirect from the pairing repository as describedabove. In this case, because the original request originated with theunregistered device, the pairing code may be considered to be in atransmission associated with the unregistered device, even though thepairing code is provided by the pairing repository in the redirect.Alternatively, in cases where the identity repository locator is sent tothe unregistered device, the unregistered device may directly transmitthe pairing code to the identity repository.

In some embodiments, the additional information may be sent in order toverify the identity of a user. Steps involving such additionalinformation will be described in further detail below. The method mayalso include associating the unregistered device with the virtualidentity using the pairing code (924). In one embodiment, the identityrepository may use the pairing code to index a table containingidentifying information for the virtual identity, as well as the secretinformation.

The method may also include sending the secret information to theunregistered device (926). In one embodiment, the secret information maycomprise the encrypted SDK and salt values. In another embodiment,additional information may be provided to the unregistered device withthe secret information. The additional information may include an AccessMaster Key (AMK) or a Control Master Key (CMK) depending on whether theunregistered device is a control device or an access device. The AMK/CMKmay be encrypted with the SDK. The additional information may alsoinclude a user's global ID (GUID), a device ID (DEVID) for theunregistered device, and a sequence value (SEQ). The SEQ may represent atransactional sequence number to be used in future transactions.

After receiving the encrypted secret information, along with anyadditional information that may be provided by the identity repository,the unregistered device may decrypt the encrypted secret information foruse in future transactions Because the unregistered device has access tothe pairing code, the pairing nonce, and the KDF, the unregistereddevice can generate a decryption key for the encrypted secretinformation. In one embodiment where the unregistered device is acontrol device, the encryption key may be used to decrypt the SDK, theSDK may be used to decrypt the CMK, and the CMK may be used to derive aControl Device Signature key pair (CDS) that can be used to signchallenges associated with future transactions.

The preceding discussion has focused on a means for sending secretinformation to an unregistered device without exposing the secretinformation or the means for encrypting/decrypting the secretinformation to an intermediary repository. However, according to someembodiments, it may be desirable to also verify that the unregistereddevice is authorized to receive the secret information using a passcode.Consider the situation where an unauthorized user gains temporarycontrol of a user's access device. The unauthorized user could thenauthorize a control device belonging to the unauthorized user using theprocedure described above, thereby obtaining the secret information. Insome embodiments, this threat can be minimized by requiring apredetermined passcode to be entered into the unregistered device andverified by either the registered device or an intermediary repository.

In some embodiments utilizing an intermediary repository, it may also bedesirable to prevent the intermediary repository from discovering thepasscode. According to one embodiment, a passcode may be “salted” on aregistered device, then hashed and sent to the repository forverification. This minimizes the threat of a dictionary attack, and onlyprovides the repository with a salted, hashed version of the passcodefor comparison. When registering an unregistered device, theunregistered device cannot simply hash a passcode. This would leave thepasscode vulnerable to dictionary attacks. It is also undesirable totransmit the salt in a usable form to the unregistered device for use inpasscode verification, until the passcode is verified. The embodimentsdescribed herein may be used to solve these and other problemsencountered when registering an unregistered device.

As used herein, the term “passcode” may refer to a password, a PIN, apersonal identifier, a one-time password, a hardware dongle, and/or thelike. According to one embodiment, if the unregistered device is anaccess device, then the passcode may comprise a password. Similarly, ifthe unregistered device is a control device, then the passcode maycomprise a PIN.

FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram 1000 of a system for verifying apasscode, according to one embodiment. In this embodiment, a singleintermediary, repository 1004, may be used. Note that in otherembodiments, as will be described below, more than one intermediary maybe used. Here, an unregistered device 1002 may generate, received, load,or acquire a value “R”. The value R may be a random number or a pseudorandom number. The unregistered device 1002 may also receive a passcodefrom a user or software process (1012).

Next, the unregistered device 1002 can create a hash of the passcode.Any known hashing algorithm may be used. In one embodiment, theunregistered device 1002 may use SHA256 or a similar algorithm. Inanother embodiment, the unregistered device 1002 may use methods relatedto elliptic curve cryptography. For example, a function such as“HashToCurve(passcode)” may be used to hash the passcode to an ellipticcurve. The hashed passcode may be “shifted” along the elliptic curveusing a trapdoor function. According to one embodiment, the hashedpasscode may be shifted along the elliptic curve using elliptic curvemultiplication by the value R. This operation may be denoted by theequation “X2=R.HashToCurve(passcode)” the value X2 may be referred to asa blind verifier. Because elliptic curve multiplication is a trapdoorfunction (i.e., difficult to calculate in the reverse direction withoutknowledge of the value R) the blind verifier X2 may be sent to therepository 1004 (1014) without revealing the passcode or the value R tothe repository 1004.

The repository 1004 may next forward the value to the registered device1006 (1016). The registered device 1006 may then perform a similar shiftof the blind verifier using the salt value. In one embodiment, theregistered device 1006 may use elliptical curve multiplication to shiftthe blind verifier X2 along the elliptical curve using the salt value.The result may we referred to as a salted blind verifier X3, whereX3=SALT.X2. The registered device 1006 may then send the salted blindverifier X3 to the repository 1004 (1018). Again, because shifting bythe salt value is a trapdoor function, the salt value is not exposed tothe repository 1004 by transmitting the salted blind verifier X3.

The repository may then forward the salted blind verifier X3 to theunregistered device 1002 (1020). The unregistered device may thencalculate an inverse of the value R. The salted blind verifier X3 maythen be shifted using the inverse of the value R to obtain the verifierV, where V SALT.HashToCurve(passcode). In one embodiment, the inverse ofthe value R may be a multiplicative inverse of the value R modulo theorder of the curve. Note that in this embodiment, if the order of thecurve is given by n, then a point on the curve multiplied by n is equalto the point on the curve (n*X=X). Therefore, R*R⁻¹ mod n=1 Note thatthe verifier V may be the same verifier used by the registered device1006 when verifying a passcode to the repository. In other words, oneeffect of these transactions is to provide a hashed, salted passcodefrom the unregistered device 1002 without making the salt valueaccessible to the unregistered device before the passcode is verified.

The unregistered device 1002 may then pass the verifier V in some formto the repository 1004. In one embodiment, the unregistered device 1002can again hash the verifier V and send the hashed verifier HV to therepository 1004 (1022). The repository 1004 can then compare the hashedverifier HV against a stored value. Alternatively, the repository 1004can hash the hashed verifier HV one or more additional times beforecomparing it to the stored value. In another embodiment (not shown), therepository 1004 could supply the unregistered device 1002 with a nonce.The unregistered device 1002 could then sign the nonce using theverifier V or a hashed verifier HV, then the signed nonce could be sentback to the repository 1004. The repository 1004 could then verify thesignature using the stored value.

FIG. 11 illustrates a block diagram 1100 of a system for verifying apasscode, according to one embodiment. In this embodiment, more than oneintermediary repository is used. This embodiment may be similar to theembodiment illustrated in FIG. 8, where both an identity repository 1108and a pairing repository 1104 are used to register an unregistereddevice 1102. As a part of the registration process, the unregistereddevice 1102 may use a software module to perform the necessarytransactions. In one embodiment, the unregistered device 1102 can use aweb browser that navigates to a webpage where JavaScript is madeavailable. In another embodiment, the unregistered device 1102 maydownload a software application that is run locally. The software moduleor web browser may prompt the user for a passcode (1112).

The unregistered device 1102 can generate the value R, hash thepasscode, and shift the hashed passcode using the value R to generatethe blind verifier X2, which can then be sent to the pairing repository1104 (1114). The pairing repository 1104 can then contact the registereddevice 1006 and transmit the blind verifier X2 to the registered device1106 (1116). The registered device 1106 can shift the blind verifierusing the salt value to generate a salted blind verifier X3.

In one embodiment, the registered device 1106 may also send an identityrepository locator through the pairing repository 1104 to theunregistered device 1102. Registered device 1106 may also send thesalted blind verifier X3 to the identity repository 1108 that isreferenced by the identity repository locator. In another embodiment, itmay not be necessary to send an identity repository locator because, forexample, the pairing repository 104 may know the location beforehand, oronly a single identity repository may be in use or available.

The unregistered device 1102 may then contact the identity repository1108. The identity repository 1108 may then send the salted blindverifier X3 to the unregistered device 1102 (1120). The unregistereddevice 1102 may then compute an inverse of the value R and use it tocompute a verifier V. The unregistered device 1102 may then send theverifier V to the identity repository 1108. Alternatively, theunregistered device 1102 may send a hashed verifier HV to the identityrepository 1108 or may sign a nonce using either the verifier V or ahashed verifier HV, depending on the embodiment.

FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart 1200 of a method for pairing anunregistered device with a virtual identity where a password isverified, according to one embodiment. The various steps of this methodmay be executed according to any of the operations described elsewherein this disclosure. For example, the method may use any of the specificdetails used to describe FIG. 9 and/or FIG. 10, along with any of theother figures described herein. The method may include receiving a blindverifier from the unregistered device (1210). This step may be performedin accordance with the previous description for computing a blindverifier. In one particular embodiment, the blind verifier may becomputed by the unregistered device at least in part by hashing apasscode on an elliptic curve. The blind verifier may also be computedat least in part by shifting the hash of the passcode on the ellipticcurve using a value R. In one embodiment, the blind verifier may bereceived by a repository. In another embodiment, the blind verifier maybe received by a pairing repository.

The method may also include sending the blind verifier to a registereddevice (1212). In one embodiment, the blind verifier may be sent to theregistered device in response to receiving a pairing code from theunregistered device. In another embodiment, it may first be ascertainedwhether either the unregistered device and the registered device havebeen disabled for pairing operations as will be described further below.In one embodiment the blind verifier may be sent by a repository, whilein another embodiment the blind verifier may be sent by a pairingrepository.

The method may additionally include receiving a salted blind verifierfrom the registered device (1214). In one embodiment, the salted blindverifier may be based on the blind verifier in accordance with theprevious description for computing a salted blind verifier. In oneparticular embodiment, the salted blind verifier can be computed by theregistered device at least in part by shifting the blind verifier on anelliptic curve using a salt value. The method may further includesending the salted blind verifier to the unregistered device (1216). Inone embodiment, the salted blind verifier may be sent and received by anidentity repository. In another embodiment, the salted blind verifiermay be sent in response to receiving a pairing code from theunregistered device.

The method may also include receiving a salted verifier from theunregistered device (1218). The salted verifier may be computed inaccordance with the previous description for computing a saltedverifier. In one embodiment, the salted verifier can be computed by theunregistered device at least in part by shifting the salted blindverifier on elliptic curve using an inverse of the value R. The saltedverifier may be received by an identity repository. The method mayadditionally include verifying that the salted verifier corresponds to acorrect passcode (1220) In one embodiment, the salted verifier can behashed one or more times before it is received by an identityrepository. In this embodiment, the salted verifier can be verified bycomparing it to a salted hashed value of a correct passcode. The saltedpasscode can be hashed the same number of times as the salted verifier.In another embodiment, the salted verifier can be verified by sending anonce to the unregistered device. The unregistered device can then signthe nonce using the salted verifier that has been hashed zero or moretimes. The identity repository can then receive the signed nonce andverify the signature. It will be understood that this method in FIG. 12may be combined with the data and transmissions previously described inthis disclosure.

In order to clarify the order of the transaction flows described inFIGS. 8-12, FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified flow diagram 1300 ofcommunications within a system for pairing devices with a virtualidentity, according to one embodiment. Flow diagram 1300 is not meant tobe exhaustive, and a number of possible transactions, including somedescribed elsewhere herein, have been left out for brevity. Note thatflow diagram 1300 may combine the operations described in relation toFIG. 9A, FIG. 9B, and FIG. 12. In other words, flow diagram 1300includes operations for encrypting and sending secret information to theunregistered device, as well as verifying a passcode received by theunregistered device. Either or both of these types of operations may beused during a pairing process of an unregistered device.

During the beginning stages of the pairing process, a passcode may bereceived by the unregistered device (1312). The unregistered device maythen compute the X2 value. In one embodiment, the X2 value may begenerated by hashing the passcode to an elliptic curve and shifting thehashed passcode according to a randomly generated value R. The X2 valuecan then be sent to the pairing repository (1314). The pairingrepository can then create a pairing code and a pairing nonce that canbe sent to the unregistered device (1316) In one embodiment, the pairingrepository can store the X2 value in a table that is indexed by thepairing code.

At this point, the unregistered device can provide the pairing code to auser of the unregistered device, for example, by displaying the pairingcode on a display screen (1317). The user can then transfer the pairingcode to a registered device as part of the pairing process (1318). Inone embodiment, the pairing code can be entered into the registereddevice by the user using a keyboard, touchscreen, mouse, voice input,and/or the like.

After receiving the pairing code, the registered device can send thepairing code to the pairing repository (1320). If the identityrepository that will be used to complete the transaction is unknown tothe pairing repository, the registered device may also send an identityrepository identifier (HREPO) along with the pairing code to the pairingrepository Using the pairing code, the pairing repository can look upthe X2 value and the pairing nonce that are indexed by the pairing codein a data structure. The pairing repository can then provide the pairingnonce and the X2 value to the registered device (1322). The registereddevice can then compute the X3 value by shifting the X2 value along theelliptic curve according to a salt value. The registered device can alsoencrypt secret data, including cryptographic keys and the salt valueusing the pairing code and/or the pairing nonce in the encryptionalgorithm. The registered device can then transfer the X3 value, theencrypted secret information, and the pairing code to the identityrepository (1324).

Turning back to the unregistered device, the user may provide an inputindicating that the pairing code has been entered into the registereddevice. In response, the unregistered device may send the pairing codeto the pairing repository (1325) The pairing repository can then use thepairing code to look up the identity repository identifier so that theunregistered device can contact the identity repository to complete thepairing procedure. In one embodiment, the identity repository identifiercan be sent to the unregistered device (1326). The unregistered devicecan then send the pairing code to the identity repository (1328). In analternate embodiment (not shown), the pairing repository can receive thepairing code from the unregistered device, and instead of sending theidentity repository identifier to the unregistered device, the pairingrepository can redirect the request to the identity repository andforward the pairing code to the identity repository. In this case, itneed not be apparent to a user of the unregistered device that such aredirection has taken place. Regardless of whether the pairingrepository redirects a request from the unregistered device or whetherthe unregistered device contacts the identity repository directly, theidentity repository may be said to receive the pairing code in atransmission associated with the unregistered device.

The identity repository may then use the pairing code to lookup the X3value associated with the pairing procedure. The X3 value may then besent to the unregistered device (1330). The unregistered device may thencalculate the verifier value V by computing an inverse value of R andshifting the X3 value along the elliptic curve according to the inversevalue of R. The verifier value V may then be hashed zero or more times(and may be denoted as HV in some embodiments) and sent to the identityrepository (1332). The identity repository may then verify the value ofthe verifier value V, or a hash thereof, and authorize the pairingtransaction. As described above, the verifier value V can be verified bycomparing it to a stored value, or hashed stored value, or by having theunregistered device sign a digital challenge using V or HV and verifyingthe digital signature.

Once the pairing transaction is authorized, the identity repository canstore the DEVID of the unregistered device. The identity repository canalso send the encrypted secret information to the unregistered device(1334). The unregistered device can then decrypt the secret informationusing a decryption key based on the pairing nonce and/or the pairingcode. The decrypted secret information may include a salt value to beused for future password verifications, as well as one or morecryptographic keys that may be used to derive other encryption keysspecific to future transactions with specific relying parties.

It should be appreciated that the specific steps illustrated in FIGS.12-13 provide particular methods of pairing devices with a virtualidentity according to various embodiments of the present invention.Other sequences of steps may also be performed according to alternativeembodiments. For example, alternative embodiments of the presentinvention may perform the steps outlined above in a different order.Moreover, the individual steps illustrated in FIGS. 12-13 may includemultiple sub-steps that may be performed in various sequences asappropriate to the individual step. Furthermore, additional steps may beadded or removed depending on the particular applications. One ofordinary skill in the art would recognize many variations,modifications, and alternatives.

It will be understood in light of this disclosure that the examples andembodiments described herein are for illustrative purposes only and thatvarious modifications or changes in light thereof will be suggested topersons skilled in the art and are to be included within the spirit andpurview of this application and scope of the appended claims.

Device Disablement

Some embodiments of the present invention relate to technologies tofacilitate disabling devices that are associated with an existingvirtual identity. Technologies related to embodiments of the presentinvention provide a method and system for disabling devices after anumber of incorrect passcode guesses related to attempts to use thevirtual identity. Also provided are methods and systems for disabling aregistered device's ability to approve the pairing of unregistereddevices after a number of incorrect passcode guesses.

Consistent with the remainder of this disclosure, a virtual identity maybe managed and used by a number of different devices. According to oneembodiment, the virtual identity may be managed by an identityrepository. The identity repository may include one or more serversoperating at a location that is geographically remote from most users.In one embodiment, the identity repository may store informationassociated with the virtual identity of each user in an encryptedformat, such that if the identity repository is compromised, thepersonal information of each user remain secure Therefore, the means bywhich the personal information can be decrypted, such as a decryptionkey, can be stored in a separate location away from the identityrepository.

In one embodiment, the identity repository may be authorized tocommunicate with one or more user devices that are registered with aparticular virtual identity. By way of example, the identity repositorymay be associated with a number of access devices and or a number ofcontrol devices associated with each virtual identity. In order to usethe virtual identity in a transaction, a user may provide identifiersand/or credentials to the identity repository in order to gain thesignature of the identity repository or to retrieve any of the personaldata in its encrypted format. For example, the identity repository maysign digital challenges provided by relying parties, such as websitesparticipating in the transaction.

As part of this process, the identity repository may need to identify adevice being used in the transaction. For example, a user may log onto aretail website using a desktop computer. In this case, the desktopcomputer could be considered an access device. The retail website mayprovide a challenge to be signed by the access device and by theidentity repository. When the access device passes the challenge to theidentity repository for it a signature, the access device can alsoprovide a user identifier and/or a device identifier. The identityrepository can then use the identifier(s) to access a particular virtualidentity stored at the identity repository. If the identity repositoryis unable to identify the access device using the provided deviceidentifier, then the identity repository may refuse to provide asignature.

In addition to verifying the device identifier for any or all devicesused in a transaction, it may be advantageous in certain embodiments toverify that the device itself is authorized for use with the virtualidentity. Accordingly, a passcode may be accepted from a user device andverified by the identity repository in order to determine that the userdevice is authorized. However, any scheme using a passcode mayeventually be susceptible to a number of different types of attacks,including dictionary attacks, trial and error, etc. Therefore, some ofthe embodiments discussed herein provide a means for disabling devicesafter a number of incorrect passcode guesses.

It may be useful to distinguish disabling a device from disabling thevirtual identity itself. If the virtual identity is disabled after acertain number of incorrect passcode guesses, then the user may beunable to use the virtual identity. Using the architecture and schemefor managing a virtual identity described above, a possible scenarioincludes a user losing control of a user device, possibly through theft.An attacker could gain control of the user device and attempt to either(1) use the virtual identity, or (2) pair additional devices with theuser identity. After detecting incorrect passcode guesses entered by theattacker, the identity repository could disable the virtual identity.However, doing so would prevent a legitimate user from using the virtualidentity on devices remaining within his/her control. In contrast,embodiments described herein may provide a method for disabling only thestolen device from performing certain actions, such as signing digitalchallenges, pairing additional devices, and so forth. This may providethe advantage of allowing continued legitimate use of the virtualidentity after the theft or misappropriation of a user device.

FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram 1400 of a system fordevice disablement, according to one embodiment. An identity repository1402 may be provided to store encrypted information associated with thevirtual identity and to manage various user devices associated with thevirtual identity. As described above, one or more computing devices maybe used with the user identity. In one embodiment, user devices may bedivided into at least two categories-access devices, and controldevices. Access devices may be primary devices from which transactionsinvolving the virtual identity are initiated. Control devices may besecondary devices that may be used to provide an out-of-band (OOB)authorization for transactions requiring such. In some embodiments, bothcontrol devices and access devices may be used to interact with theidentity repository 1402 and to pair unregistered devices with thevirtual identity.

Each user device may use software modules that may be associated withthe identity repository 1402. For example, access device 1419 mayinclude software module 1409 operating thereon. Software module 1409 maycomprise a web browser, JavaScript, a webpage, a dedicated application,a background process, and/or the like. Similarly, control device 1418may include software module 1408 operating thereon. If control device1418 comprises a smart phone, software module 1408 may comprise an amobile application (“app”) made available by the identity repository1402 or by an entity associated with the identity repository 1402.

Generally, each user device may both send and receive information to theidentity repository 1402. In one exemplary transaction, the identityrepository 1402 may send a message to control device 1416 requestingthat a passcode be entered. This request may be part of a transactioninitiated by an access device, such as access device 1420. This requestmay also be part of an interaction with the identity repository 1402involving only control device 1416. For example, control device 1416 mayhave previously sent a request to the identity repository 1402 tomanage, extract, view, decrypt, transmit, manipulate, or otherwiseinteract with information related to the virtual identity. Either ofthese transactions, along with other similar types of transactions, mayprompt the identity repository 1402 to request a passcode guess fromcontrol device 1416, according to system preferences, relying partypreferences, device preferences, and/or user preferences.

In response, software module 1406 may prompt the user to enter apasscode guess. The passcode guess may then be transmitted to theidentity repository 1402 (1430). Using methods and systems described inthe previous section, the passcode guess need not be transmitted in anunaltered form. It may be advantageous to perform certain operations onthe passcode guess that make it difficult for an attacker to decipherthe passcode guess after it is entered. For example, the passcode guessmay first be combined with a salt value and/or hashed using variousknown algorithms, such as elliptic curve cryptography algorithms, beforeit is sent to the identity repository 1402. This may lessen thelikelihood of success of a dictionary attack and may also prevent theidentity repository 1402 from storing anything other than asalted/hashed verifier value that cannot easily be used to determine thepasscode.

If the identity repository 1402 determines that the passcode guess iscorrect, the transaction involving control device 1416 may beauthorized. On the other hand, if the identity repository 1402determines that the passcode guess is incorrect, the identity repository1402 may take appropriate action. In one embodiment, if the number ofpasscode guesses meets or exceeds a threshold value, the identityrepository 1402 may disable control device 1416 such that control device1416 cannot be used in certain types of transactions in the future.Additionally, the identity repository 1402 may send notifications toremaining user devices that have not been compromised. For example,identity repository 1402 may send notifications to software modules 1407and 1408 operating on control devices 1417 and 1418 respectively. Also,the identity repository 1402 may send notifications to software modules1409 and 1410 operating on access devices 1419 and 1420 respectively.These notifications will be discussed in greater detail below.

FIG. 15 illustrates a simplified block diagram 1500 of a system fordevice disablement when pairing unregistered devices, according to oneembodiment. In this embodiment, the passcode guess may be associatedwith an operation for pairing an unregistered device 1502 using aregistered device 1506. This particular embodiment may be similar to theembodiment described in relation to FIG. 11. However, it will beunderstood that the transactions illustrated in FIG. 15 are merelyexemplary, and that many different types of transactions may be used topair devices.

According to this embodiment, the unregistered device 1502 may receive apasscode from a user (1512). The unregistered device 1502 may performoperations intended to conceal the value of the passcode, such ashashing the passcode and/or shifting the hashed value along and ellipticcurve by a value R to form a blind verifier. The blind verifier may thenbe sent to a pairing repository 1504 (1514), and then forwarded to theregistered device 1506 (1516). The registered device 1506 may then shiftthe blind verifier by a salt value to form a salted blind verifier,which may then be sent to the identity repository 1508 (1518), and thenforwarded on to the unregistered device 1502 (1520). The unregistereddevice may then compute the hashed verifier by shifting by the inversevalue of R, and send the hashed verifier back to the identity repository1508 (1522) The identity repository 1508 may then determine whether thepasscode entered by the user is correct by comparing the hashed verifierto a stored value. Other transactions and data may also be involved inthis procedure that are not explicitly shown in FIG. 15.

In this embodiment, the identity repository 1508 may determine that thepasscode is correct, in which case the unregistered device 1502 may beprovided with secret data and/or paired with the virtual identity. Onthe other hand, the identity repository 1508 may determine that thepasscode is incorrect, in which case the identity repository 1508 maytake action. In one embodiment, the identity repository 1508 may refuseto pair any additional unregistered devices using registered device1506. In another embodiment, the identity repository 1508 may preventthe unregistered device 1502 from being registered using any registereddevice. In another embodiment, the identity repository 1508 may send anindication to the pairing repository (1524). Such an indication may beused to prevent the pairing repository 1504 from registering theunregistered device 1502 during future attempts, or may be used toprevent the pairing repository 1504 from pairing any unregistered deviceusing registered device 1506, depending on the embodiment.

FIG. 16 illustrates a flowchart 1600 of a method for disabling devicesassociated with a virtual identity, according to one embodiment. Themethod may include receiving a request from a device (1610). The devicemay comprise an access device or a control device. The device maycomprise any computing device, including a laptop computer, a desktopcomputer, a thin client, a tablet computer, a server, a smart phone, aPDA, and/or the like. In one embodiment, the request may be received bya repository. The repository may comprise an identity repository, apairing repository, or another similar repository. The repository may belocated geographically away from the device. In one embodiment, therepository may store encrypted information associated with the virtualidentity and may provide authentication procedures for transactionsinvolving the virtual identity.

In one embodiment, the request may comprise a passcode guess. Thepasscode guess may comprise a PIN. The passcode guess may also comprisea password. In one embodiment, the passcode guess may comprise a digitalcertificate provided by software module or a hardware dongle. Thepasscode guess may also comprise any combination of alphanumericcharacters. In another embodiment, the passcode guess may comprise abiometric identification, such as a retinal scan, a fingerprint, a voiceverification, a DNA verification, and/or the like. The passcode guessmay be provided by a user of the device, who may be authorized orunauthorized. The user may be an owner or an attacker. In anotherembodiment, the passcode guess may be provided by a hardware or softwaremodule.

In one embodiment, the passcode guess may be cryptographicallytransformed in order to obscure its value. For example, the passcodeguess may be salted with a value. The passcode guess may also be hashedaccording to known hash algorithms, such as SHA256 and elliptic curvehashing algorithms. The passcode guess may also be shifted on anelliptic curve after it is hashed by one or more values. It will beunderstood that the passcode guess that is received in this step may bealtered in many different ways to conceal its value.

In one embodiment, the request may further comprise a device identifier.The device identifier (DEVID) may correspond to a value stored at therepository to identify a previously registered device. The deviceidentifier may also correspond to a value entered by a user during thecurrent transaction. For example, during a pairing transaction, the useror unregistered device may provide a device identifier that may be usedto identify the unregistered device in future transactions if thepairing procedure is successful. The device identifier may be unique tothe device and may be checked against existing device identifiers toavoid collisions.

The method may also include determining whether the passcode guess isincorrect (1612). In one embodiment, the passcode may be compared to avalue previously stored at the repository. In embodiments where thepasscode has been hashed using a trapdoor function, the resulting valuemay be compared to a previously stored hash value at the repository. Inanother embodiment, a value may be received from another device andcompared to the passcode guess. In other embodiments, additionaloperations may also be performed on the passcode guess, acryptographically altered version of the passcode guess, a stored value,and/or a hashed stored value in order to determine whether the passcodeguess is correct.

The method may additionally include incrementing a number of incorrectpasscode guesses received within a time interval (1614). In oneembodiment, this step may be implemented by storing a value in one ormore memories at the repository. This value may be associated with thevirtual identity and may be changed during any transaction in which apasscode is received. In one embodiment, the number of incorrectpasscode guesses may be incremented by a value of 1 each time a passcodeguess is incorrect. In another embodiment, the number of incorrectpasscode guesses may be incremented by values of 2, 3, 4, etc based onthe type of transaction. For example, a first incorrect passcode guessmay incremented by 1, while a second incorrect passcode guess during thesame transaction may increment by a value of 2. In another example,incorrect passcode guesses during low value transactions may incrementedby value of 1, while incorrect passcode guesses during high-valuetransactions may incremented by higher values. In yet another example,incorrect passcode guesses from portable devices may incremented by highvalue, such as 3, while incorrect passcode guesses from stationary orless portable devices may incremented by a lower value. Increment valuesmay also be based on whether a device is a control device or an accessdevice, the time of the transaction, whether encrypted information isrequested by the transaction, the identity of a relying party, the ageof the virtual identity account, the strength of the passcode, and/orthe like. Increment values may also be based on user preferences, devicepreferences, repository preferences, and/or relying party preferences.

In another embodiment, if it is determined that the passcode guess iscorrect, the number of incorrect passcode guesses may be decremented bya value. For example, a correct passcode guess may decrement the numberof incorrect passcode guesses by 1. A correct passcode guess during ahigh-value transaction may decrement the number of incorrect passcodeguesses by a value of 2 or 3. Additionally, a correct passcode guess mayreset the number of incorrect passcode guesses to an initial value, suchas 0. The number of incorrect passcode guesses may also be reset orotherwise changed by an authenticated user or user device.

In one embodiment, the time interval may be a periodic time interval,such as a day or a week. In other words, the repository can store anumber of incorrect passcode guesses for the current day or the currentweek. At the end of the periodic time interval, the number of incorrectpasscode guesses may be reset or otherwise decreased. In anotherembodiment, the time interval may be a sliding time window. In thisembodiment, the repository can store a number of incorrect passcodeguesses that have occurred within one day or one week from the currenttime. Incorrect passcode guesses that pass outside of the time windowmay have their values removed from the number of incorrect passcodeguesses. In another embodiment, the time interval may be establishedbased on the type of transaction. For example, for high-valuetransactions the time interval may be longer than it would be for lowvalue transactions. Also, a separate value may be stored for the numberof incorrect passcode guesses related to each type of transaction. Forexample, one value may be stored for control device transactions, whilea separate value may be stored for low value transactions. The timewindow may be based on any transaction characteristic such as value,time, device, user, repository location, device location, and/or thelike. In some embodiments, the time interval may be infinite or may bethe lifetime of the associated virtual identity.

The method may further include determining that the number of incorrectpasscode guesses received within the time interval is greater than orequal to a threshold (1616). In one embodiment, the threshold may be astatic value that is uniform for each transaction. In anotherembodiment, each user device may have its own threshold based on thetype of device, the device security, the device location, and/or thelike. In another embodiment, the threshold value may be adjusteddynamically based on characteristics of the transaction such as thoseenumerated above. A threshold that changes dynamically may be combinedwith the dynamically changing increment values discussed above to createa fully customizable security setting for each situation. These settingsmay be specified by the user, the repository, the device, and/or therelying party, and they may be stored at any device involved in thetransaction.

In some embodiments, the number of incorrect passcode guesses can bedirectly compared with a threshold to determine whether the number ofincorrect passcode guesses is greater than or equal to the threshold. Inother embodiments “greater than or equal” may be evaluated as a relativeexpression. In other words, this may cover situations where a thresholdis violated that uses metrics other than numerical values to track andevaluate incorrect passcode guesses.

The method may also include generating an indication that subsequentrequests associated with the device identifier should not be granted(1618). Generating this indication may also include storing thisindication in one or more memories located at the repository orelsewhere. In one embodiment, the subsequent requests may comprisepairing operations. In this embodiment, either the unregistered deviceor the registered device may be implicated Either of these devices maybe restricted from other operations in addition to pairing operations.In another embodiment, the subsequent requests may comprise requests touse the virtual identity. In yet another embodiment, the subsequentrequests may comprise requests to approve a transaction, to storepersonal information, to change preferences, to authenticate a user,and/or the like. Any or all of these transaction types may berestricted, based on the particular embodiment.

In one embodiment, a transaction type may be restricted by preventingfuture requests from being approved. For example, during a pairingoperation, a restricted unregistered device may send request to apairing repository. Instead of accepting the request and forwarding itto a registered device, the pairing repository may simply block orsuspend the request. In some cases, the pairing repository may send aresponse to the unregistered device that the pairing operation hasfailed or has been canceled. In other cases, the pairing repository neednot send a response to the unregistered device such that the attackerneed not be alerted that possible fraud has been detected. Someembodiments may even send an indication that the transaction/pairing wassuccessful in hopes that the attacker will provide more information thatcan be used to locate the compromised device. These same operations canbe applied to the registered device in a pairing transaction.

In one embodiment, additional devices may also be restricted in additionto the device from which the incorrect passcode guesses originated. Forexample, a user preference may stipulate that when the threshold numberof incorrect passcode guesses is met or exceeded, all control devicesmay be restricted. In another embodiment, certain types of transactionsmay be restricted, such as high-value transactions, nighttimetransactions, transactions outside of a home geographic area, and/or thelike. In another embodiment, the restriction may be time-limited for anyand all of these devices and/or transaction types. For example, othercontrol devices may be restricted for an interval of, for example, 6hours, after which the restriction may be lifted. This embodiment mayprovide an opportunity for a user to take action without restrictinguncompromised devices longer than necessary.

The method may optionally include sending the indication to additionaldevices (1620). In one embodiment, where a pairing operation is takingplace, passcode verification may take place at an identity repository.If the threshold is met or exceeded, the identity repository may sendthe indication to the pairing repository. In this case, the pairingrepository can then detect and stop future pairing attempts with theidentified device.

Additionally, the indication may be sent to one or more user devices. Inone embodiment, the repository may send the indication to one or more ofthe user's control devices. For example, the repository may send theindication as a push notification to a user's smart phone. Theindication may also be sent to a user's access devices. Note that inthis embodiment, only the device from which the incorrect passcodeguesses were received is restricted, all of the users other devices arestill able to fully utilize the virtual identity. For example, theindication sent to a user's access device may include details about thetransactions during which incorrect passcode guesses were received. Thismay include a vendor, a relying party, a location, a device ID, anyinformation provided by the user of the compromised device, atransaction value, shipping address, and/or the like. The indicationsent to the access device may also include options for reporting thetransaction and/or minimizing possible damages, such as restrictingadditional user devices, restricting certain transaction types, ortracking additional attempts by the compromised device.

It should be appreciated that the specific steps illustrated in FIG. 16provide particular methods of disabling devices according to variousembodiments of the present invention. Other sequences of steps may alsobe performed according to alternative embodiments. For example,alternative embodiments of the present invention may perform the stepsoutlined above in a different order. Moreover, the individual stepsillustrated in FIG. 16 may include multiple sub-steps that may beperformed in various sequences as appropriate to the individual step.Furthermore, additional steps may be added or removed depending on theparticular applications. One of ordinary skill in the art wouldrecognize many variations, modifications, and alternatives.

FIG. 17 illustrates a simplified block diagram 1700 of a system fordevice disablement, according to one embodiment. The system for devicedisablement 1720 may be implemented using hardware modules, softwaremodules, or a combination of hardware and software. In some cases, eachof the sub-modules depicted in FIG. 17 may be implemented using solelyanalog or digital hardware such as is disclosed later herein.

The system for device disablement 1720 may include identity database(s)1708 that store and manage encrypted information associated with virtualidentities. The system for device disablement 1720 may also include oneor more communication interfaces 1702 that are configured to send andreceive transmissions to and from user devices. For example, the one ormore communication interfaces 1702 may receive wireless transmissions,network transmissions, Internet-based transmissions, and/or the likefrom control devices 1712 and 1714, along with other user devices notexplicitly illustrated.

The system for device disablement 1720 may also include a requestprocessing module 1704. The request processing module 1704 may includeone or more processors, such as microprocessors, microcontrollers,digital logic, and/or the like. The request processing module 1704 maybe configured to receive and process requests, such as requestsincluding a passcode. The system for device disablement 1720 may furtherinclude a passcode verification module 1706. The request processingmodule 1704 may share at least a portion of a received request with thepasscode verification module 1706. The password verification module 1706may be configured to determine whether a passcode is correct. Thepassword verification module 1706 may then make the results of thisdetermination available to the request processing module 1704, which maythen use the one or more communication interfaces 1702 to send aresponse.

In one embodiment, the various modules and systems in FIG. 17 may beimplemented in software and may reside on separate computer systems.Alternatively, multiple modules may be combined on the same or similarcomputer systems. In addition, whether in hardware or software, somemodules may be combined together into a single module performing thefunctions of both individual modules. Similarly, a single module may besplit into multiple modules. It will be understood in light of thisdisclosure that any arrangement of the modules, as well as anyimplementation in both software and hardware, may be used by variousembodiments.

It will be understood in light of this disclosure that the examples andembodiments described herein are for illustrative purposes only and thatvarious modifications or changes in light thereof will be suggested topersons skilled in the art and are to be included within the spirit andpurview of this application and scope of the appended claims.

Exemplary Hardware

Each of the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented in one ormore computer systems. FIG. 18 is a block diagram illustratingcomponents of an exemplary operating environment in which variousembodiments of the present invention may be implemented. The system 1800can include one or more user computers 1805, 1810, which may be used tooperate a client, whether a dedicated application, web browser, etc. Theuser computers 1805, 1810 can be general purpose personal computers(including, merely by way of example, personal computers and/or laptopcomputers running various versions of Microsoft Corp.'s Windows and/orApple Corp.'s Macintosh operating systems) and/or workstation computersrunning any of a variety of commercially-available UNIX or UNIX-likeoperating systems (including without limitation, the variety ofGNU/Linux operating systems) These user computers 1805, 1810 may alsohave any of a variety of applications, including one or more developmentsystems, database client and/or server applications, and web browserapplications. Alternatively, the user computers 1805, 1810 may be anyother electronic device, such as a thin-client computer,Internet-enabled mobile telephone, and/or personal digital assistant,capable of communicating via a network (e.g., the network 1815 describedbelow) and/or displaying and navigating web pages or other types ofelectronic documents. Although the exemplary system 1800 is shown withtwo user computers, any number of user computers may be supported.

In some embodiments, the system 1800 may also include a network 1815.The network may be any type of network familiar to those skilled in theart that can support data communications using any of a variety ofcommercially-available protocols, including without limitation TCP/IP,SNA, IPX, AppleTalk, and the like. Merely by way of example, the network1815 may be a local area network (“LAN”), such as an Ethernet network, aToken-Ring network and/or the like; a wide-area network; a virtualnetwork, including without limitation a virtual private network (“VPN”);the Internet; an intranet, an extranet; a public switched telephonenetwork (“PSTN”); an infra-red network; a wireless network (e.g., anetwork operating under any of the IEEE 802.11 suite of protocols, theBluetooth protocol known in the art, and/or any other wirelessprotocol); and/or any combination of these and/or other networks such asGSM, GPRS, EDGE, UMTS, 3G, 2.5 G, CDMA, CDMA2000, WCDMA, EVDO etc.

The system may also include one or more server computers 1820, 1825,1830 which can be general purpose computers and/or specialized servercomputers (including, merely by way of example, PC servers, UNIXservers, mid-range servers, mainframe computers rack-mounted servers,etc.). One or more of the servers (e.g., 1830) may be dedicated torunning applications, such as a business application, a web server,application server, etc. Such servers may be used to process requestsfrom user computers 1805, 1810. The applications can also include anynumber of applications for controlling access to resources of theservers 1820, 1825, 1830.

The web server can be running an operating system including any of thosediscussed above, as well as any commercially-available server operatingsystems. The web server can also run any of a variety of serverapplications and/or mid-tier applications, including HTTP servers, FTPservers, CGI servers, database servers, Java servers, businessapplications, and the like. The server(s) also may be one or morecomputers which can be capable of executing programs or scripts inresponse to the user computers 1805, 1810. As one example, a server mayexecute one or more web applications. The web application may beimplemented as one or more scripts or programs written in anyprogramming language, such as Java™, C, C# or C++, and/or any scriptinglanguage, such as Perl, Python, or TCL, as well as combinations of anyprogramming/scripting languages. The server(s) may also include databaseservers, including without limitation those commercially available fromOracle®, Microsoft, Sybase®, IBM® and the like, which can processrequests from database clients running on a user computer 1805, 1810.

In some embodiments, an application server may create web pagesdynamically for displaying on an end-user (client) system. The web pagescreated by the web application server may be forwarded to a usercomputer 1805 via a web server. Similarly, the web server can receiveweb page requests and/or input data from a user computer and can forwardthe web page requests and/or input data to an application and/or adatabase server. Those skilled in the art will recognize that thefunctions described with respect to various types of servers may beperformed by a single server and/or a plurality of specialized servers,depending on implementation-specific needs and parameters.

The system 1800 may also include one or more databases 1835. Thedatabase(s) 1835 may reside in a variety of locations. By way ofexample, a database 1835 may reside on a storage medium local to (and/orresident in) one or more of the computers 1805, 1810, 1815, 1825, 1830.Alternatively, it may be remote from any or all of the computers 1805,1810, 1815, 1825, 1830, and/or in communication (e.g., via the network1820) with one or more of these. In a particular set of embodiments, thedatabase 1835 may reside in a storage-area network (“SAN”) familiar tothose skilled in the art. Similarly, any necessary files for performingthe functions attributed to the computers 1805, 1810, 1815, 1825, 1830may be stored locally on the respective computer and/or remotely, asappropriate. In one set of embodiments, the database 1835 may be arelational database, such as Oracle 10g, that is adapted to store,update, and retrieve data in response to SQL-formatted commands.

FIG. 19 illustrates an exemplary computer system 1900, in which variousembodiments of the present invention may be implemented. The system 1900may be used to implement any of the computer systems described above.The computer system 1900 is shown comprising hardware elements that maybe electrically coupled via a bus 1955. The hardware elements mayinclude one or more central processing units (CPUs) 1905, one or moreinput devices 1910 (e.g., a mouse, a keyboard, etc.), and one or moreoutput devices 1915 (e.g., a display device, a printer, etc.). Thecomputer system 1900 may also include one or more storage device 1920.By way of example, storage device(s) 1920 may be disk drives, opticalstorage devices, solid-state storage device such as a random accessmemory (“RAM”) and/or a read-only memory (“ROM”), which can beprogrammable, flash-updateable and/or the like.

The computer system 1900 may additionally include a computer-readablestorage media reader 1925 a, a communications system 1930 (e.g., amodem, a network card (wireless or wired), an infra-red communicationdevice, etc.), and working memory 1940, which may include RAM and ROMdevices as described above. In some embodiments, the computer system1900 may also include a processing acceleration unit 1935, which caninclude a DSP, a special-purpose processor and/or the like.

The computer-readable storage media reader 1925 a can further beconnected to a computer-readable storage medium 1925 b, together (and,optionally, in combination with storage device(s) 1920) comprehensivelyrepresenting remote, local, fixed, and/or removable storage devices plusstorage media for temporarily and/or more permanently containingcomputer-readable information. The communications system 1930 may permitdata to be exchanged with the network 1920 and/or any other computerdescribed above with respect to the system 1900.

The computer system 1900 may also comprise software elements, shown asbeing currently located within a working memory 1940, including anoperating system 1945 and/or other code 1950, such as an applicationprogram (which may be a client application, web browser, mid-tierapplication, RDBMS, etc.). It should be appreciated that alternateembodiments of a computer system 1900 may have numerous variations fromthat described above. For example, customized hardware might also beused and/or particular elements might be implemented in hardware,software (including portable software, such as applets) or both.Further, connection to other computing devices such as networkinput/output devices may be employed. Software of computer system 1900may include code 1950 for implementing embodiments of the presentinvention as described herein.

The preceding methods and systems may be implemented by a computersystem, such as computer system 1900 in FIG. 19. Each step of thesemethods may be done automatically by the computer system, and/or may beprovided as inputs and/or outputs to a user. For example, a user mayprovide inputs for each step in a method, and each of these inputs maybe in response to a specific output requesting such an input, whereinthe output is generated by the computer system. Each input may bereceived in response to a corresponding requesting output. Furthermore,inputs may be received from a user, from another computer system as adata stream, retrieved from a memory location, retrieved over a network,requested from a Web service, and/or the like. Likewise, outputs may beprovided to a user, to another computer system as a data stream, savedin a memory location, sent over a network, provided to a web service,and/or the like. In short, each step of the methods described herein maybe performed by a computer system and may involve any number of inputs,outputs, and/or requests to and from the computer system which may ormay not involve a user. Therefore, it will be understood in light ofthis disclosure, that each step and each method described herein may bealtered to include an input and output to and from a user, or may bedone automatically by a computer system.

In the preceding description, for the purposes of explanation, numerousspecific details were set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of various embodiments of the present invention. It willbe apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that embodiments of thepresent invention may be practiced without some of these specificdetails. In other instances, well-known structures and devices wereshown in block diagram form.

This description provides exemplary embodiments only, and is notintended to limit the scope, applicability, or configuration of thedisclosure. Rather, this description of the exemplary embodiments willprovide those skilled in the art with an enabling description forimplementing an exemplary embodiment. It should be understood thatvarious changes may be made in the function and arrangement of elementswithout departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as setforth in the appended claims.

Specific details are given in this description to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the embodiments. However, it will be understood by oneof ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments may be practicedwithout these specific details. For example, circuits, systems,networks, processes, and other components may be shown as components inblock diagram form in order not to obscure the embodiments inunnecessary detail. In other instances, well-known circuits, processes,algorithms, structures, and techniques may be shown without unnecessarydetail in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments.

Also, it is noted that individual embodiments may have been described asa process which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flowdiagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchartmay describe the operations as a sequential process, many of theoperations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition,the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminatedwhen its operations are completed, but could have additional steps notincluded in a figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function,a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process correspondsto a function, its termination can correspond to a return of thefunction to the calling function or the main function.

The term “machine-readable medium” includes, but is not limited toportable or fixed storage devices, optical storage devices, wirelesschannels and various other mediums capable of storing, containing orcarrying instruction(s) and/or data, including non-transitory media. Acode segment or machine-executable instructions may represent aprocedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine,a module, a software package, a class, or any combination ofinstructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment maybe coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passingand/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memorycontents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc., may be passed,forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memorysharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, etc.

Furthermore, embodiments may be implemented by hardware, software,firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or anycombination thereof. When implemented in software, firmware, middlewareor microcode, the program code or code segments to perform the necessarytasks may be stored in a machine readable medium. A processor(s) mayperform the necessary tasks.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for disabling a device associated with avirtual identity, the method comprising: receiving, from the device, arequest to register an unregistered device, the request associated withan electronic on-line transaction comprising: a passcode guess, whereinthe passcode guess comprises a digital signature derived from auser-provided passcode; and a device identifier; determining that thepasscode guess does not authorize registration of the unregistereddevice; incrementing a number of incorrect passcode guesses receivedwithin a time interval, wherein the incrementing is based onpredetermined values for a type of transaction; determining that thenumber of incorrect passcode guesses received within the time intervalis greater than or equal to a threshold; storing an indication thatsubsequent requests associated with the device identifier should notregister unregistered devices; disabling the device associated with thevirtual identity based on the receiving, the determining that thepasscode guess, the incrementing, the determining that the number ofincorrect passcode guesses received, and the storing the indication;receiving a request to register a second unregistered device, therequest to register the second unregistered device comprising: a secondpasscode guess; and the device identifier; and denying the request toregister the second unregistered device based on the indication.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising sending the indication thatsubsequent requests associated with the device identifier should notregister unregistered devices to a pairing repository.
 3. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the unregistered device comprises a smart phone.
 4. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the request to register the unregistereddevice further comprises an encrypted salt value.
 5. The method of claim1, wherein the request to register the unregistered device furthercomprises a pairing code.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein theunregistered device comprises a laptop computer, a desktop computer, athin client, a tablet computer, a server, or a personal digitalassistant (PDA).
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the time interval isa periodic time interval.
 8. The method of claim 7, wherein the periodictime interval is a day or a week.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein thetime interval is a sliding time interval measured from a current time.10. The method of claim 1, wherein the time interval is based on thetype of transaction.
 11. An identity repository comprising: one or moreinterfaces that receive requests from a device; one or more processors;and one or more memories communicatively coupled to the one or moreprocessors, having instructions stored thereon, which, when executed bythe one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: receivea request from the device through the one or more interfaces, therequest associated with an electronic on-line transaction comprising: apasscode guess, wherein the passcode guess comprises a digital signaturederived from a user-provided passcode; and a device identifier;determine that the passcode guess is incorrect; increment a number ofincorrect passcode guesses received within a time interval, wherein theincrementing is based on predetermined values for a type of transaction;determine that the number of incorrect passcode guesses received withinthe time interval is greater than or equal to a threshold; generate anindication in the one or more memories that subsequent requestsassociated with the device identifier should not be granted; disable thedevice associated based on the receive, the determine that the passcodeguess is incorrect, the increment, the determine that the number ofincorrect passcode guesses received, and the generate the indication;receive a request to register a second unregistered device, the requestto register the second unregistered device comprising: a second passcodeguess; and the device identifier; and deny the request to register thesecond unregistered device based on the indication.
 12. The identityrepository of claim 11, wherein the one or more memories further storeencrypted personal information associated with a virtual identity,wherein the device identifier is associated with the virtual identity.13. The identity repository of claim 11, wherein the request from thedevice comprises a request to use a virtual identity.
 14. The identityrepository of claim 11, wherein the request from the device comprises arequest to pair an unregistered device with a virtual identity.
 15. Theidentity repository of claim 11, wherein the instructions, when executedby the one or more processors, further cause the one or more processorsto: send the indication to a pairing repository that is physicallyseparate from the identity repository.
 16. The identity repository ofclaim 11, wherein the device comprises a laptop computer, a desktopcomputer, a thin client, a tablet computer, a server, a smart phone or apersonal digital assistant (PDA).
 17. The identity repository of claim11, wherein the time interval is a periodic time interval.
 18. Theidentity repository of claim 17, wherein the periodic time interval is aday or a week.
 19. The identity repository of claim 11, wherein the timeinterval is a sliding time interval measured from a current time. 20.The identity repository of claim 11, wherein the time interval is basedon the type of transaction.